LAWS OF LIFE

S. H. MELLONÉ

Marquis of Tweeddale 1 Curtis

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AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ELEMENTS OF ETHICS

BY

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PREFACE

THIS book is intended to provide a simple introduction to the elements of Ethics; in other words, its aim is to give an elementary account of the foundation and meaning of the chief moral laws of life.

It is intended in the first place as an aid to Teachers who wish to make this subject a matter of systematic instruction in classes of adolescents or of adults, in Sunday Schools and similar institutions. The book is essentially related to the purpose of the Sunday School, so far as this purpose is to form true and useful lives. The plan of the book admits of its being put into the hands of the pupils themselves—for which reason the style of direct address has been deliberately adopted—and also of its being used by the Teacher as a basis of his talks to and with the class.

The author hopes, however, that the book will be found useful not only for class-work, but for all who wish to have brought together as clearly as possible, in moderate compass, what appear to be the main ideas animating those who are working along the common

highway of rational life for the betterment of humanity.

When the book is used in class under the guidance of a Teacher, the latter will use his own discretion in the matter of further expanding the topics brought forward in the following pages, and further illustrating them from the Bible and from literature and life. The author has frequently suggested illustrations; but if he had multiplied their number he would have excessively increased the size of the book and also obscured a much more important purpose which he had in view. For, while most books of this kind limit themselves to 'applied Ethics,' or, in other words, deal only with applications and keep principles somewhat in the background, the purpose of this book is to draw out, in the simplest possible way, certain fundamental principles and then show how the applications follow from them.

For the information of the student of the literature of Ethics, it may be said that the main argument of this book is of the same type as that which is set forth in different ways in such books as Professor James Seth's *Study of Ethical Principles*, and the first volume of the Rev. Dr. Hastings Rashdall's *Theory of Good and Evil*. Whatever is good, is good *for*

something; and the highest good is good for the highest purpose. Appeal is therefore made to the consequences of actions, but not to mere states of feeling. Actions are judged by their effects on character and on the development of what is distinctively *human* in the highest and most complete meaning of the word.

As regards the method and manner of exposition suitable for the purpose for which this book is intended, the author found much suggestiveness in the following books: *The Morals of Evolution*, *Helps for Daily Living*, and *Life Questions*, all by the Rev. Dr. Minot J. Savage, of New York; *Successful Life*, by Mr. John Dendy, of Manchester; and Essays by the Rev. Philip Henry Wicksteed and Mr. R. Bartram in a volume entitled *Religion and Life*.

At a time when very general interest is being taken in the question of providing pupils with such a genuine Instruction in Morality as shall help them to find their way amid the increasing complexities of modern life, it is hoped that this book may not be without use as a slight contribution to the solution of that question.

S. H. M.

HOLYWOOD, COUNTY DOWN,
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LAWS OF LIFE

Chapter I

WHAT IS THE USE OF LIVING?

AN ancient writer has said that the way of transgressors is hard. By 'transgressors' he meant of course those who transgress or act contrary to the moral law—who do what is wrong. The striking point about the statement is this: the writer speaks of their *way* as hard, and not merely of their end or future fate. He believed that the hardness, the difficulty, the trouble, the pain come straight out of the wrongdoing always and everywhere, as sure as the heat comes out of the flame.

Many people have fancied that this is not so. They seem to suppose that, if it were not for the law of the land and similar restraining forces, it would be the pleasantest thing to do wrong. They seem to suppose that the word 'right' carries with it, as part

of its meaning, the idea of something which we 'ought' to do but do not really like doing, something which goes against our inclinations. There is little doubt that these people are mistaken and that their mistake is a very dangerous one. Part of the purpose of this book is to help you to understand how this is so, and how the mistake arose.

We shall see that the things that are wrong are the very things that themselves hurt us all, soon or late, in many kinds of ways, and tend to keep the world back just in the places where it most needs to be helped forward.

Instinct and Conscience

The animals beneath us are governed by what we call 'impulse' or 'instinct.' This means that they do just what they are inclined to do, or if they do not, it is because fear or some stronger force has prevented them. The animals have no notion of right or wrong.

Sometimes you will notice things which may make you think that after all some animals really have a perception of right and wrong—especially tame animals which are accustomed to human companionship. A dog, for example, sometimes looks ashamed for what he has done. But this is because he has

done something that his master does not like, and is afraid of displeasing him. His feeling springs from personal affection, which is a very different thing from the sense of right or wrong. Personal affection may be good or bad: it all depends on the person for whom the affection is felt. Charles Dickens, in his story, "Oliver Twist," tells of a man called Bill Sykes who was a burglar, and a brute, and a murderer too. This man had a dog which was devoted to him. But it never entered the dog's mind to think whether it was *right* to serve and submit to such a man as Sykes. That was beyond the dog's range.

When we come to deal with men and women, we find (even if they are no better than wild savages) a different state of things. We find that *conscience* has been born, so that *right* and *wrong* may be recognized; the higher kind of affection, *intelligent sympathy*, begins to influence conduct; and some kinds of disposition and character are called *good*, others *bad*, and no other difference among human beings is believed to be so important as this. Our business in this book is to help you to understand and feel the value of the great things for which these words stand—'right' and 'wrong,' 'conscience,' 'sympathy' 'good,' and 'bad.'

Right and Wrong

What do we mean by right and wrong actions?

Our answer is this. Those acts are right which make us all *happier* and *better*, and so help the world forward towards harmony; these it is our duty to do; those acts are *wrong* which take away from our welfare and so keep the world back.

In this statement there are two very important words, 'happier' and 'better.' Every one knows 'in a general sort of way' what these words mean; but we need to have our ideas made more clear.

Happiness is not the same as mere pleasure. Pleasures come and go; they are transitory, and depend entirely on what we are doing or thinking at the time. If you think of such pleasures as eating, drinking, working, resting, going on a holiday, you will see that this is true. They last as long as something else lasts, and when that ends, the pleasure ends.

Have you noticed how greatly pleasures differ in *kind*? The kind of pleasure depends on the kind of life; the better the life, the better the kind of pleasures it can feel. The pleasures of a pig, however great or intense, can never be so good as those of a human being; and the pleasures of a fool can never

be as good as those of a man of high character and intelligence. Think of anyone whom you know to be a hero or heroine, whether in the field of battle and death, or in the battle of life that is always going on. You will see that he has deserved that name because he did not find his happiness just in being comfortable or enjoying himself, but only in noble deeds, which lost him many kinds of pleasure but brought him his happiness.

The simple truth is that there is no other kind of happiness worthy of the name but the happiness of becoming a better man or woman.[1] Let us then turn to the question of what we mean by making people *better*.

What Man is Good for

When you say that a thing is good, you mean that it is good 'for something'—good for some purpose or use. Even a piece of wood is 'good for' any *use* to which it can be put. Even a wild animal, a lion, a tiger, or an eagle, is good for the kind of life for which it is by nature fitted.

This comes out still more clearly when we speak, for example, of a 'good horse' or a 'good watch-dog'—'good,' because fitted to do

[1] We return to this subject in Chapter II, p. 19.

well the kind of service which we require of him.

What then is a man, a human being, good for? Some people, you will say, are not good for much. Yet even these might be helped to make themselves better. We repeat, asking the question in its full meaning, What is man good for? He is good for what he is fitted for, and *all* that he is fitted for.

The use or purpose of our life means all the best that we are capable of being, of doing, of becoming, in body and mind, in thought and feeling. We are made for that. Circumstances may prevent our being more than a little of it, but none the less we are capable of it. Think of some great engineer or inventor of whom you know. Suppose he had never had the chance of becoming that, and had lived the life of a farm labourer. No doubt he would have been a much better labourer than the average, because of his unused gifts; but he would still have been capable of the greater thing—he would have 'had it in him.' In the same way, many a man, though he has done nobly amid the difficulties of his life, has never been able to unfold his real possibilities of goodness. We all have capacities of real goodness in us, of which we must make the best *we can*, in the place in the world where we find ourselves.

Perfection of Character

I will give a quotation which will help to enforce what I have been saying. 'The law of the use or conduct of a thing or person is known from the nature of that thing or person. We say that a knife "ought" to be so sharp as to be capable of cutting. Why ought it? Because that is what a knife is for; that is the nature of a knife; that expresses the highest and best possibility of a knife. We say of a boat, a ship, or a yacht, that it "ought" to be capable of sailing, of weathering the storm, of going safely through the hour of danger. Why? Because it is the nature of a good boat to accomplish that. We say of a watch that it ought to keep correct time. Why? Because that is what a watch is for. A good watch must fulfil the law of its nature; if it does not, it is unreliable. And so we say of any living creature also. So we must say of man. Man "ought"—what? Ought to fulfil the highest possibility of his being; ought to be a man; ought to be all and the highest that being a man implies—for that is his nature. He ought not simply to be an animal. Why? Because there is something in him more than an animal. He ought not simply to be a brain, a thinking machine, although he ought to think. Why?

Because that does not exhaust the possibilities of his nature; he is capable of being something more than a brain. We say he ought to be a moral being. Why? Because to be a moral being is to live out his nature. He ought to live as high and complete a life as it is possible for him to live, and he ought to stand in such a relation to his fellow-men that he shall aid them in doing the same. Why? It is just the same as in all these other cases: because this and this only is developing the full and complete stature of a man. He is not a man in the highest, truest, deepest sense of the word until he is that and does that; he is only a fragment of a man so long as he is less and lower.'

Chapter II

OUR REAL GUIDES AS TO CONDUCT

IF you were to ask many thoughtful people what *conscience* is, some of the answers would be to this effect—'Conscience is that which tells me what is right and what is wrong, what I ought to do and what I ought not to do.' This answer is only partly mistaken. It puts too much upon conscience. Conscience is not always a satisfactory or safe guide as to what is right and what is wrong. It tells you, over and over again, insistently, that there is something which is right, and that you must find it out and do it. We have seen what this means. The voice of conscience is the voice of that obligation to do and be our best, the best that is in us. But conscience is not the final court of appeal to decide which particular acts are right and which are wrong.

You know that in deciding cases under the law of the land Courts are formed with different powers. The judges of a higher Court may set aside or modify the decision given by the judge of the lower Court. And there is the possibility of appeal even from the higher Court to a supreme Court. We borrow this title, and use it in a similar meaning, when we say that conscience is not the supreme court of appeal in deciding a particular case of right and wrong.

The supreme court of appeal for deciding cases of right and wrong is *human experience*. Let us look into this more closely.

Human Experience

The experience of the world, through thousands of years, has shown beyond doubt that certain kinds of conduct make ourselves and others worse instead of better, crush the better parts of us and give the worse full play. Other kinds of conduct lift up the level of human activity to something larger, higher, fuller in the way of life. Conduct of the one kind prevents men living together in peace, harmony, and co-operation ; conduct of the other kind helps them so to live. This has been discovered, just as we have dis-

covered what is healthy and what is harmful in the way of food.

For example, if people are to live together at all, murder and violence must be forbidden. If such deeds were regarded as 'right,' our state would be worse than that of the wild beasts, for even they do often live together in peace. Again, if people are to rise above the level of the lowest savages, it must be possible for them to own things and have possessions of their own without incessant fear of robbery. And they must be able to rely on one another's statements and promises, if their dealings with each other are to produce anything better than disaster and death.

These facts cover at least three of the commandments handed down from the early Hebrew lawgivers: 'Thou shalt not kill,' 'Thou shalt not steal,' 'Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour.'

In thousands of different ways this human race, from the beginning, has been engaged in one age-long experiment as to what is best for the individual, for groups of individuals, for the family, for society. We are not always clear, and circumstances alter cases; but practically we have no difficulty in deciding and agreeing about these great general questions of right and wrong provided that

it is the right and wrong that we really desire to discover—*that which makes for the common good and not merely the interests of a group or a class of persons.*

Actions and their Results

Thus you have always to appeal to the results and effects of your actions. And here we come upon one of the reasons why some people have supposed that our duty and our inclinations always go against one another. Sometimes we do things because we like their first or immediate results, and never trouble about their further results. We gratify our first inclination. But if, afterwards, harm results, then we ought to have gone against our first inclination. A kind-hearted, sentimental person might at first be inclined to give money to a drunken beggar. If he does so the result is only further drunkenness—no good, only harm. There are many things we do in relation to each other which produce immediate gratification, but which afterwards produce sorrow, disaster, and pain. This is why a man sometimes must say *no* when his companions want him to join in something which they want to do. It is hard to be unsociable, to refuse to do what

others do; but sometimes you must do so for the sake of something more important—the greater good.

Another and perhaps the chief reason which has made some people think that duty and inclination are enemies, lies in the fact of *obligation*, for which *conscience* is in reality only another name. The fact of moral obligation may be described in different ways; people may form different opinions as to where the obligation comes from; they may, and often do, disagree in a particular case as to what it is best to do; but the obligation remains—it seems as if they were urged, by something *higher than themselves*, to find what is best and to do it.

We experience moral obligation whenever we find a difference between 'what is actual' and 'what is possible' in our lives—between 'the real' and 'the ideal.' We are living our life on a certain level, and are acting accordingly; and we see above us and beyond us another kind of life at a higher level. We may actually see some one living it; or we may have been made to feel, by reading or hearing, that others have really lived it; or the possibility of it may have come to us through our own thinking. It is a life at a higher level, bringing forth better actions

than ours—actions which we are capable of doing and which we say we ought to do. This is what the difference between 'possibility' and 'reality' in conduct, means; and we are under obligation to turn the possibility into a reality.

There is always a difficulty in getting to the higher level. If there is no difficulty, that particular kind of obligation ceases to be felt, and the thing is done 'by nature.' But some of our inclinations are sure to stand in the way; and not until they are got out of the way, can duty itself become inclination, so that we do the right because we want to. A perfectly *honest* man would never feel any temptation to be dishonest even if there were an opportunity with no risk of detection.

If we work out this thought a little further, we can perhaps form an idea of what the morally perfect man would be. A perfect man will be one who has risen to such a state of heart and life that the things he ought to do will be the things he loves to do. His whole nature will leap out to do what is right and good. He would have attained perfect happiness as well as perfect goodness.

This is as far ahead of us as the heavens are high above the earth. But it is still possible for men even in this present life to

know, here a little and there a little, the joy of doing what ought to be because they love to do it. To have conquered one bad habit, and to cease to feel its hindrance to better living, affords a little experience of what that joy is like.

Suffering, a Sure Result of Wrong

Never commit the terrible blunder of thinking that you can escape the consequences of your own acts. The world in which we live is not a haphazard concern that has tumbled together by accident. It is made according to a Great Plan which is worked out by *laws*; and when we know these laws, we find them to mean this: that if we do certain things we shall inevitably suffer, and suffer the worst kind of suffering and that which is hardest to mend; and if we do certain other things we shall grow into the happiness which is real and lasts. There is nothing arbitrary in this. Some *men* may be arbitrary in their rewards and punishments; they may punish you for a thing one time, and let you off or even reward you for it another time. But the world is made on a plan which means that there are eternal results, inescapable results. You are never 'let off.' The laws

of the land, which men have made, can be evaded, and some of them may even become 'a dead letter.' The laws according to which the world is planned are eternally operative and are never evaded.

I may do that which is against the law of my body; give myself up to some habit, some indulgence, that seems very pleasant. But I suffer for it. I take away from my health, from my power as a physical being. If I carry it far enough, I fall ill; if I still go on with it, it will mean death.

Under the influence of some inclination, desire, or passion, I may do that which injures some one else, or many others—which takes away from the fulness of their life, interferes with their happiness or their welfare. If I carry it far enough, the clumsy machinery of human law will find me out. But suppose that I evade the law of the land, or (which is often possible) do all the harm I want to without doing anything for which the law can get hold of me. What then? Then I injure and degrade myself, lower the range of my own life, become less and less of a man—a poorer and more ignoble kind of man.

Do you not believe that even if there were no other punishment, this is the worst punishment there could be?

This is the greatest life-question that could be asked. Do not try to answer it hastily. Real life and experience alone can answer it. What do real life and experience say? I quote a reply which has been given to this question. I quote it because I believe it is deeply true, and also because it puts this great matter in such a way that you will be able to judge of it for yourselves. You will remember that we are speaking about the results of a person's conduct *on himself*, setting aside, for the moment, its effects on other people.

Degradation

'The inevitable result, in every healthy nature, of a wrong deed, is pain. A man is conscience-stricken, as we say. He feels ashamed of himself for that which he has committed. And, if his fellow-men know it, the additional pain which comes to him then is not simply that he is found out, but it is that these same moral natures, which are like his own, look into his soul, and reflect the self-contempt which he feels for his own evil deeds. And there is no suffering in this world —if you have ever felt it, or if you have ever studied the nature of men so as to know what it means—equal to that of a living but

wounded conscience, the righteous sense of nobility in a man, that makes him look down with contempt upon himself. Men have found this so unbearable that they could not continue to live. Men who have committed a crime, and have not been discovered, have found this stricken conscience so much heavier a load of suffering than they could bear, that they have come and submitted themselves to the law, that they might try, at least, to make expiation. They have given themselves up, and said, Let me suffer at the hands of my fellows for the deed I have committed; let me hide myself somewhere from the face of the earth!

'There are human beings, if such they can be called, who are past feeling anything of this kind. A man at last gets his conscience seared, so that he does not feel any remorse. He will commit the most outrageous deeds, and not be sorry for them in the least. He will break all the laws of society. He loses all care for public opinion, and may even come to rejoice in the notoriety of his own disgrace. What shall we say of a case like this? It is my deliberate opinion that just that man who is rejoicing in his villainy and disgrace, is suffering a punishment severer than all.

'Let us start with an illustration. There is

an old Greek legend which tells us how when the warrior-king Ulysses is on his way home, he stops at a certain island, and his crew falls into the hands of the sorceress, Circe. All his companions, who had left the ship and gone up the island to visit her palace, she turns into swine. When Ulysses comes to look after them, because they had not returned, he finds them brutes, rooting in the mire, grunting and sleeping in swinish content. They had forgotten that they ever were men. Think you that Ulysses, as he looked upon them in that condition, would say, These men are well-off: they are in no pain. No calamity has befallen them, so long as they do not know it. Is it just as well to be swine as men, if only you do not know that you are a brute? Is it nothing to be deprived of manhood, to lose the delicious unrest of thought, to miss the pleasures of friendship and the sight of the stars? Is the man who is degraded, shut out from all the higher, nobler, sweeter realms of life, who does not know what they mean—is he free from the penalty of broken law, because he does not know what he has lost?

'If a youth who has grown to the age of fourteen, and either by disease or some congenital malformation has suddenly ceased to

grow, and so stands still and becomes only an idiot, we do not think him as well-off as another because he does not know that he is an idiot. Is there nothing pitiable about a man who is insane, though he may think himself a king? Or if a man is blind, he suffers no less deprivation because he does not know what "seeing" means. So a man who is degraded in his moral nature, who does not know what it means to be a man; who does not know any of the unspeakable delights of those who inhabit the higher ranges of human life; who comes to live only for the sensual, and be indifferent to shame—such a man is bearing a load of penalty far worse than any evil he can possibly inflict on his victims, unless he can induce them to become willing partners in his degradation. If he only knew that there was something better, and longed after its attainment, there would be some hope for him; but, so long as he does not know it, he is excluded from all possibility of advance.'

In the story of "Uncle Tom's Cabin," it is told how the old black hero was brutally and cruelly punished for refusing to flog a wretched slave who was not able to do the work to which she was driven. When Tom lay moaning in a stifling garret, the

woman, Cassy, came to bathe his wounds.

'And what are these miserable dogs you work with,' said she, 'that you should suffer on their account? Every one of them would turn against you, the first time they got a chance. They are all of them as low and cruel as they can be; there's no use in your suffering to keep from hurting them.'

'Poor critturs!' said Tom—'what made 'em cruel? And, if I give out, I shall get used to't, and grow, little by little, just like 'em! No, no, missis! I've lost everything—wife, and children, and home, and a kind mas'r, and he would have set me free, if he'd only lived a week longer—I've lost everything in this world, and it's clean gone for ever, and now . . . no, I can't get to be wicked, besides all!'

'But it can't be that the Lord will lay the sin to our account,' said the woman; 'he won't charge it to us when we're forced to it; he'll charge it to them that drove us to it.'

'Yes,' said Tom, 'but that won't keep us from growing wicked. If I get to be as hard-hearted as that Sambo, and as wicked, it won't make much odds to me how I come so; it's the *bein'* so—that's what I'm a dreadin'.'

The woman fixed a wild and startled look on Tom, as if a new thought had struck her.

Ideals

How do we know that a character, such as I have been describing, is sinking down to a state that is beneath manhood?

We know it because others, right about us, living in the world, really are better. Take an example of another kind. How do we know that a man is short-sighted? Because others can see better. That, and nothing else, is what first suggests there being anything wrong with his eyes. Or how do we know that a man is wanting in bodily strength? Because other men are stronger.

So, we know that a man is wanting in the greatest thing of all, character, because there are others who are better. There are men on earth great and noble in character and wisdom, and always have been. And because we see what they are, we know what human beings ought to be. Think of the life of Jesus, as related in the first three Gospels. Every one believes that he was a man and had a human character, whatever else they may believe about him. Read the Gospels, then, so as to understand his human character, and the kind of man he was, with the help of such a simply but finely written book as Thomas Hughes' "The Manliness of Christ." We are not able to make ourselves the equals of Jesus;

but we can make ourselves better than we are, if we try. Just as in the life of the body, we may not be able to make ourselves the equals of Samson of old, but we may be able to make ourselves stronger than we are.

I hinted before, when speaking of moral obligation, that your knowledge and feeling of a life which is better than your own and yet possible for you to live, comes to you for the most part from the better lives of other men. Some one whom you admire, whom you would like to resemble, becomes in this way your *ideal*. All of you have or have had such ideals, if only in bodily skill of some sort, such as cricket or football. You have had them from your schooldays onwards. What your ideals will be, depends on your own wisdom and character, and the amount of life that you can see and appreciate. Perhaps you can recall some of the different people and things you admired and 'looked up to' from childhood and youth. Some of them were very foolish admirations. Readers of Charles Dickens's story, "David Copperfield," will remember young Copperfield's innocent and profound admiration and even reverence for Steerforth, although Copperfield was a great deal the better man of the two.

Things which are worse than foolish may be

idealized. A young man has been known to take the life of an extravagant spendthrift as a 'fine thing,' to be admiringly imitated, or the life of a hard smoker and drinker. A woman of fashionable 'society' has been known to take as an ideal for her daughter, a marriage to a millionaire whom she (the mother) knows to be a scoundrel. Trashy stories and so-called 'penny dreadfuls' have been known to make boys idealize successful pirates, highwaymen, or robbers. Even criminals have their ideals of a 'fine and successful' career of crime.

The truth seems to be that human beings must have ideals—if not good ones, then bad and foolish ones. If your ideal is a good one it will help you to be better, and if it is a bad one it will make you worse than you are—for an ideal, as we have seen, always becomes an example for imitation. The heroism, greatness, and genius, which have lived in human hearts and minds become an uplifting force when they are brought before you, in biography or story, so that you can feel and appreciate them.

Never forget this: however far the great men of the world are beyond you, they are beyond you on your own line. The heroism of the world is only the commonplace lifted to a higher level. It is the quiet, faithful

performance of duty, called upon to manifest itself on some great occasion which calls for great sacrifice; just as it is the same common electricity, which does our work through the telephone, telegraph, and tramway wires, and at certain times flashes out in the brilliancy of the lightning and sets the sky aflame. And the commonplace heroism which shows itself in obscure ways and ordinary duties is not less wonderful than that which is celebrated in history, song, and story.

Real and Conventional Morality

One warning must be added when we are speaking of the value of examples and ideals. If you are contented merely to accept the standard of your own class or 'set'—you are in danger of setting up a *conventional* morality, and putting a sham in place of the real thing.

We have seen that our ideas of what actions are right and what are wrong are the result of experience and discovery, through their effects on human welfare; and in the main these ideas are tried and true. But because different standards of judgment have been employed through these ages of experience and trial, and some false standards, many conventional virtues and vices have grown up also. This means simply that people have

regarded some things as forbidden and others as binding which do not touch real vital human concerns at all; and they have laid more stress upon the conventional virtues than upon the real ones, and treated the conventional vices as worse than those that are real.

The reader of the Gospels will remember that this is exactly the reason for which the religion of 'the scribes and Pharisees' is so severely condemned. They taught observances which were nothing but customs and traditional rules, and made these conventions of equal importance with—or even of greater importance than—'the weightier matters of the law,' justice, mercy, and truth. Jesus would leave them their conventional morality, if they must have it; but the thing he cared about was that the other, the real morality, should not be left undone.

There have been social customs imposed by the opinion of a class, and at least condoned by public opinion, which we now regard as worse than foolish. The practice of duelling, which was binding until a century ago in England on all who considered themselves 'gentlemen'—and still is binding in some other countries—is a remarkable example of a purely conventional custom which was once regarded as a serious duty, but now seems to

us absurd and criminal. Why? Because to settle personal quarrels by appeal to the sword is a method that *works for evil.* This needs no proof for us.

You will agree with this; but there is something else to be remembered too. What this is, you will see from an example. In Charles Dickens's story, "Barnaby Rudge," a certain Sir John Chester, a polished hypocrite and scoundrel, with no spark of manliness in his composition, speaks thus with himself, after an interview with his enemy and rival: 'Here is one of the inestimable advantages of having a perfect control over one's inclinations. I have been tempted in these two short interviews to draw upon that fellow fifty times. Five men out of six would have yielded to the impulse. By suppressing mine, I wound him deeper and more keenly than if I were the best swordsman in all Europe and he the worst. You are the wise man's very last resource,' he said, tapping the hilt of his weapon; 'we can but appeal to you when all else is said and done. To come to you before, and thereby spare our adversaries so much, is a barbarian mode of warfare.'

I said that to settle personal quarrels by appeal to the sword is absurd and criminal. But this quotation reminds us of what we

can easily understand—that sometimes a duel may have been avoided from motives lower and meaner than any that ever prompted a man to engage in one. This man avoided one in order that he might wound his enemy more bitterly than the sword could do; he was led by a malignant desire to do this, and by a disinclination to incur the personal inconvenience of the arbitrament of the sword. These motives are far lower—that is, they express a worse type of character and are worse in their effects on the world—than the impulse of anger which would have prompted other men to the more violent course.

A deed may be bad in its effects and influence; but it does not follow that a man who deliberately abstains from that deed is a good man. This depends on his reason for abstaining from it.

Are there any other practices which still exist, whose disappearance would be as welcome as the disappearance of duelling, though they are still regarded as 'a matter of course,' if not as a duty? There are none, perhaps, quite so mischievous as duelling. But what ought to be your feeling about some forms of 'sport,' so-called, such as hunting tame deer, coursing bagged rabbits, and shooting caged birds? Or what should your feeling be about

sports which certainly have a better claim to deserve the name—such as hunting foxes and shooting preserved game? Public opinion supports them. But what was public opinion about 'sports' like bear-baiting and cock-fighting, two or three centuries ago, and what is it now? In Spain, public opinion supports bull-fighting. It is more than possible that in such matters public opinion is supporting a mere convention, and a bad convention too.

It is easy to see how conventional customs came to be regarded as binding. Look at it in politics. Persons are born under a despotism, a monarchy, or a republican form of government; and they come to believe that the welfare of men is bound up with the particular kind of political organization to which they have been accustomed. Elsewhere people believe that the welfare of men depends on quite another kind of government. And all these beliefs spring not from thought and inquiry but only from custom.

In the same way there are social ideas and customs that dominate us. Most of them may be harmless and many of them right. But such customs originate not because people have deliberately inquired into them and decided that they are right, but because they have become (so to speak) part of the air the

people breathe, so that they can hardly imagine anybody being free from them. Other people are trained in another kind of society, and grow into another set of social customs and ideas. For example, apart from the requirements of bodily health, customs regarding dress are merely conventional rules. They have their rightful place, and by a fussy disregard of them you may give them an importance which they do not deserve. But persons may be found who would think it a worse thing to have their clothing stained than their character stained, and who would 'cut' an acquaintance for the clothing he wore when they would not 'cut' him for a vice or for neglecting to pay his debts.

Still, these social conventions are usually harmless, unless they are made to take the place of genuine morality. But conventional virtues and vices may become positive dangers to the public welfare, when they are customs resting only on the *supposed interests of a class, or a trade or profession, or a party*, and yet are made as binding on their members as if they were vital to the common good. For example, though I have no doubt whatever that *trade unions* are very valuable and necessary institutions, I should like to know how many unions would be as severe on a

workman because he was a wife-beater as they would be because he disregarded some custom of the trade; or how many would admit that a workman who 'scamps' his work, is intemperate, and neglects his duties to his home, is *worse* than a 'blackleg.' A *political party*, again, is simply a collection of people having common principles and common aims which they believe will be for the public good, and which they wish to express in legislation. But if such a party becomes a thing to be supported whatever it does, to be whitewashed always and opposing parties blackened, to be upheld even if it becomes the tool of a self-seeking class, then loyalty to such a party, though it is a conventional virtue, is treason to the welfare of men.

You will be in no danger of becoming a slave to conventional but unreal duties, if you remember that the one thing you ought to be concerned about is the welfare of men, the *common good*. The final question is whether your opinions and your actions are helping or hurting the world. The one obligation you are under is to help, and not to hurt—to *learn* to do right; and in order that you may do that, you must use all the light you can get from any source to help you to know what the right is.

Chapter III

TRUE SELF-REGARD *VERSUS* SELFISHNESS

THE outcome of what we have been saying is this. I cannot do harm to other people without at the same time doing even greater harm to myself. And I cannot do my best for others without *being* in myself what I ought to be—that is, without letting the best part of myself unfold and grow.

The reverse is equally true. Just as a diamond cannot shine without flashing its light on all things round it, or a flower be fragrant without spreading its fragrance out on the air, or the sun shine without scattering its rays broadcast in every direction: so a man cannot be what he ought to be without the free outgiving of those things in him which are highest and best, and which become stronger and more his own because they are given out to others.

As an illustration, take the case of *teaching*, by which I mean the real teaching that consists in helping others to understand. By the effort to help a pupil to understand a thing you help yourself to understand it better. You never feel so much master of a subject as when you have successfully explained it to some one else. In these things it is the simple truth that you gain what you give. Or think of such things as generosity, pity, tenderness, the will to help. These could never come to be but for our relationship to other people. If ever we are to be our best we must be surrounded by our fellows, 'touching elbows, clasping hands' in the world's work; and by helping others, something in you that is good is not taken from you but made stronger. Here, too, you gain what you give.

It is equally true that if you are to give, you must have something to give. You cannot teach unless you have the knowledge and the training. You cannot lead unless you have learnt the way yourself. You cannot feel with anyone else or understand him unless you have the capacity in yourself for doing it. Thus, true self-regard is to make yourself strong in those things that are best in you and most helpful to other people.

If you have not got these things, but their

opposites, you injure not only yourself but other people; you take away from the common good, by your very existence. This needs no showing in the case of immoral qualities, hatred, vice, or self-indulgence. But in the case of such a thing as *ignorance*, is not the same conclusion inevitable? The ignorant man by his very existence puts a premium upon ignorance and increases it around him. As far as his influence goes, he increases the amount of bigotry, the amount of intolerance, the amount of superstition, in the world. So far as he is able to get control of things, his ignorance is a source of worse mischief; he may injure his family, his friends, or fellow-workers, and even may endanger the country. His ignorance is at once a wrong to himself and to others. If he improves himself and acquires real knowledge, his knowledge is a good, if it is used for good.

It is true that many men read and study and improve themselves in the most grossly selfish way, with no idea of helping anybody but themselves. This is why we said that knowledge is a good 'if it is used for good.' A selfish man is one who tries to get something for himself *at the expense of the welfare and happiness of somebody else.* What he tries to get makes no difference to the selfish-

ness. It may be wealth, or social position, or political advancement, or some kind of mental cultivation. A father who deprives his family of what they need in order that he may have the means of indulging his scientific or artistic or literary tastes, is not much better than one who spends on drink what ought to go to their daily bread. The welfare of those who depend on him is a far greater good than his own mental cultivation, which at the best will not be productive of very much. In fulfilling his duties to them, he is 'cultivating'—if we may use the word—a better part of himself. Which sort of man would you rather have as a friend—to say nothing of a father?

True self-regard, then, is quite different from selfishness. Selfishness means gain at others' loss. True self-regard and regard for others, work together in real life.

Character and Manhood

As a final illustration, look at one of the chief of the causes which have made the world better, or rather (to keep the question within bounds) let us say, which have made our country, England, better during the last hundred years.

It is recorded in the Gospels that Christ said, when speaking of the world's real needs, 'seek ye first the kingdom of God and his righteous-

ness ; and all these things shall be added unto you.' Taking the saying in connexion with its context, we may understand it thus. People at large over the world are anxiously seeking after food and drink and clothing and houses and money and land, and all the ordinary objects of human desire ; people are thinking and worrying about little or nothing else—as if, when these things were gained, they would be certain to bring happiness with them—as if they were the cause, and happiness the effect. But the truth is, that if you bring your whole being, body and soul, into accord with the highest and best (and that means, into right relations with God), those other objects of human desire will take care of themselves. The Christian principle, then, is that Character and Manhood (which includes Intelligence) are the cause, and social welfare or happiness the effect ; and you cannot have the second until you have the first. If the world is better than it used to be, it is because there are more good men and women in different parts of the world than there used to be. Human experience has abundantly verified the truth of this.

Take the case of crime. By 'crime' we mean those actions that the law punishes. The criminal law was far more severe a hundred

years ago than it is now. To what is the noticeable decrease of crime due? Not to the laws, nor to anything that the State has done; but to the fact that there are more men and women to-day than there used to be who want to do right, and try hard to lead clean, honest, and helpful lives. In fact, what makes the world *more civilized*, modern nations less like savage tribes, modern countries less like islands full of animals? Inventions and discoveries and all that we call material progress—all these have their share in it; but they would do no good unless they were *used* for good. What makes the world more civilized is that there is more care for truth, more honesty, more love and pity and feeling for suffering, more desire to help. As human beings have learnt the meaning of love, learnt to use their minds and develop their intellectual powers, learnt to desire purer and more wholesome things, to have high admirations and to reverence the great souls of the world—as they have learnt such things they have built up a *public feeling* which, as it finds rational expression in intelligent public opinion, becomes the mightiest force for good in the world.

Take the case of Temperance. We are told on good authority that there is much less

intemperance, in the matter of strong drink, than there used to be. What is the cause of this? Not law, not institutions, not the State, but the force of an enlightened and growing and more wholesome public opinion; and any future improvement will again be the result of public opinion, of what you and I and our neighbours think and feel about it.

You cannot have a perfect society, free from injustice, free from vice, free from crime, until you get enough individual persons who are free from vice, from crime, from dishonesty, from every kind of evil, to make that society. You may change your social order a thousand times, and the outcome will still be the result of the average wisdom and average goodness of the individual persons who compose it.

We repeat, then, that as a man does what he ought to do, and comes to be what he ought to be, he gives forth to others those things in himself which are highest and best, and which become stronger and more his own because they are given.

But this true self-regard may mean much self-sacrifice. Is that a contradiction? No; it means that something evil, or something that is less good, is given up for the sake of a greater good. If we are to be human beings at all, there are some things that must be

sacrificed: those passions which we have in common with the ape and the tiger—brutal savagery, ferocity, and cunning. But there are many harmless natural desires and instincts which have their rightful place; and we are called upon to sacrifice them only when they stand in the way of something better—something worth more for the one aim of all living, that we may grow more and more into the true manhood for which we are made.[1]

[1] We shall return to this when speaking of the meaning of Self-control (Chapter V, p. 57).

Chapter IV

SYMPATHY

WE have been speaking of the genuine goodness which, when a man has it, is good for himself and others alike. What we call *sympathy* is like the flower or fruit of that goodness.

What do we mean by sympathy? The word means 'feeling with' or 'suffering with.' Not that it is all a matter of feeling. For before we can feel with a person or a situation we must understand it; our feeling with it is limited by our understanding of it.

This *understanding* is partly *imagination*. Many people think that imagination has little or nothing to do with right conduct. It has a great deal to do with it. If I am to be in right relations with another person I must be able to put myself in his place. I must be able to picture or imagine his condition, his

wants and ideas, as well as my own. I must imagine, and then I can feel with him through the power of that imagination.

Beginning and Growth of Sympathy

The *rise of the human race from savagery and barbarism* consists to a great extent in the growth of imaginative sympathy.

There is a kind of sociability or fellow-feeling found even among animals—especially among birds and gregarious animals. Animals, however, have been known to attack a wounded companion, as if they were enraged by his helplessness. A tribe of ants, out on a travel, and meeting an ant of another species, would kill it.

At the beginning of human history, sympathy was limited to blood-relationship; it was a matter of the family. There was no feeling, no care, or practically none, for any creature beyond that little narrow circle. In such a condition, men were not associated into nations or even into tribes or clans. Later, the family grew into the *clan*, of which examples are seen in the patriarchal associations referred to in the earlier books of the Bible. Sympathy and understanding widened out and included all who were supposed to have

descended from the common ancestry. The next stage was when the family expanded into the *tribe*, though the fact or fiction of kinship still existed in some cases. A good example of this kind of life is found, or rather was found, among the North American Indians.

How does this tribal sympathy express itself? Members of the tribe feel an interest in other members. They feel an injury or an insult to others as though it were done to themselves. They also feel and express resentment if any member of the tribe breaks its customs or does things contrary to its welfare. They are not troubled because the members of some other tribe are injured, robbed, abused, or put to death; that does not concern them.

By and by the tribe settles into one or more village communities or 'city-states,' as seen in ancient Greece. These communities have some common aims, and some amount of fellow-feeling. In Greece, for instance, they were capable of forming an occasional league or confederacy, and of combining against foreign aggression. But for the most part they were hostile and eager to fight among themselves.

Out of a group of such communities arises the nation as we understand it to-day. People may be scattered over an immense extent of

country; they are no longer of one blood in the ordinary meaning of the word; the nation is made up of people of many different origins —'Saxon and Norman and Dane are we,' but all of us English. Comprehension and understanding widen to take in the whole nation, and sympathy keeps step with the understanding. We are all touched by what touches the nation.

Extension to all humanity and animal life

A glimpse of something larger even than national sympathy, has been gained here and there as the ages have gone by: the extension of our sympathy, our feeling, our power to care, until it includes anyone who is a human being. Hints and suggestions of this were found in many parts of the world hundreds of years ago. The Bible says that God 'made of one blood *all nations* of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth.' An old Roman writer said, 'I am a man, and nothing human is foreign to me.' But the comprehension of this, and the feeling that goes along with it, have developed very slowly. We find it very difficult to care in any real, true sense for people beyond the limits of our own country. Many of our laws, many

of our national policies, are arranged on the understanding that *if a thing is to the interest of some other nation, it must be injurious to ours*, or that the calamity of some other nation may be a benefit to us. This is a state of thought and feeling which the world has got to outgrow ; and to outgrow it, will not prevent our satisfying all the claims of our own country upon us.

There is a step even beyond this. The best people in the world are beginning to let their sympathies reach beyond the limits of what is human and reach to any creature that can enjoy or suffer. Animals have their rights. We see the recognition of this in the existence of Societies for the protection of animals, and the enforcement of laws against cruelty.

Cruelty does not consist simply in the infliction of pain, or even of severe pain. It is cruelty when we inflict pain upon any living thing *without having in view a purpose whose importance is proportionate to the amount of the pain.* A slight suffering we impose for slight reason. Serious suffering can be justified only by very grave reason for its infliction. And in each case we have to think of the amount of suffering caused, and the benefit resulting from it, and balance one against the other.

Difficulties in the way of Sympathy

We have been speaking of the spread of sympathy. But there are many barriers and hindrances in the way of its spreading. Two of the greatest hindrances are *race-differences* (to which we have referred) and *class-differences*.

People have not had the imaginative power to realize that those who are unlike themselves are only *other selves*, capable of suffering as they suffer, of enjoying as they enjoy, of having rights of their own. They dislike the foreigner simply because he is a foreigner. In Shakespeare's "Merchant of Venice," Shylock, malignant and revengeful as he was, spoke the truth about this: 'Hath not a Jew eyes? Hath not a Jew hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions? Is he not fed with the same food, hurt with the same weapons, subject to the same diseases, healed by the same means, warmed and cooled by the same winter and summer?'

We need not only consider our relation to foreign peoples to look for barriers to imaginative sympathy. Some of the worst of such barriers arise out of what are called class-differences. Think of the difference between the rich and the poor, between the nobleman and the peasant, between the em-

ployer and the employed, between the capitalist and the labourer. I will illustrate the kind of difficulty of which I am speaking, by a quotation which is not only true in itself, but is interesting as coming from a man who is a strong opponent of socialism :—

'How hard it is for a man who is prosperous, who is rich, who has everything his heart can desire, to sympathize with the worker, the man who wants more wages! He thinks of the worker as interfering with the smooth ongoing of his business, as a disturber. Why cannot he get along with his thirty shillings a week, no matter what the size of his family? If he can keep from starving, why should he interfere with the prosperity of the capitalist by asking for more? The capitalist spends on trifles in half a dozen different directions, in the course of a year, more than the worker spends for himself and all his family. And yet the capitalist does not stop to put himself in the worker's place. In the meantime the labourer finds it difficult to put himself in the place of the capitalist. He thinks that, because the capitalist has plenty of money, he must be entirely happy; and yet the balance of happiness may be on the side of the labourer. Neither side understands the other; neither side has true sympathy

with the other; neither comprehends the point of view of the other.

'The problem seems a very simple one to me. A business can be carried on and the labourers be paid such and such a wage, or it cannot be. If it cannot be, the labourers can be made to understand it, if they have trust and belief in the honesty of the managers. It is merely a little matter of arithmetic, as to whether such and such wages can be paid or cannot. It is hard to make a man who is suffering understand how it is that the capitalist can be unable to pay the wages that his labourers need when he himself is able to own his yacht and his automobile, and to run off, when he will, to Switzerland or elsewhere, when his business is in a bad way. It is hard to convince the labourer that business is done at a loss when there are so many evidences of the capitalist's prosperity. If, however, both sides understood and were in sympathy, these things would take care of themselves.'

Humanity and Pity

The first great practical outcome of Sympathy is the growth of Humanity and Pity—the desire and will to help those who are in danger or need, or cannot help themselves.

You will understand something of the force of this motive, if you call to mind all the institutions which have grown up and organized efforts which have been made, in modern times, to help the helpless.

I will remind you of a considerable number of them. I hope you will not commit the folly (as some people do) of imagining that all these things come into existence somehow 'as a matter of course.' They have come into existence solely and only because of the *good-will* of an immense number of men and women, who have given time and labour and money for their sake.

Some of the more familiar things will easily occur to you. Such are—the hospitals for the sick (with the discoveries of ways by which *pain* may be lessened); asylums for the insane; convalescent homes; orphanages for fatherless children; homes for waifs and strays, neglected and forsaken little ones; societies for the protection of children from cruelty. Think also of the history and work of the National Life-boat Institution, and the number of lives saved by this means every year; the number of lighthouses erected to guide sailors round our coasts; the fire brigades in nearly every town. Read the life of Florence Nightingale, and the story of the

Red Cross Society's work in lessening the amount of human pain amid the horrors of war; read of what John Howard did in prison reform. Think of the work of the Royal Humane Society in rewarding and encouraging those who have exerted themselves to save the drowning; and the work of the Ambulance Societies of England and Scotland in promoting the instruction of the public in the means of 'first aid' in cases of accident or injury.

A wonderful fact is that those nations where Humanity and Pity do their work in these ways most effectively, are the strongest. They are strongest in battle, if it comes to war; strongest in finance, in manufactures, in all that goes to make a powerful national life. Science tells us that this has always been so. The great scientific thinker and discoverer, Charles Darwin, has shown, in his book on "The Descent of Man," that *those communities and nations which have the largest number of sympathetic members are strongest and best able to survive.* You hear a great deal about national progress and prosperity; remember that the most important thing on which it depends is expressed in the motto *Each for all, and all for each.*

On one and all of us lies a personal obliga-

tion to help the aged, the young, the weak, the unfortunate, the oppressed, wherever we are able to do it. The proverb says that 'Charity begins at home'; but it does not end there.

Chapter V

SELF-CONTROL AND MORAL FREEDOM

JOHN BUNYAN wrote a book called "The Holy War," in which he describes a war between the city called 'Mansoul' and the Powers of Evil, who succeed in capturing it; and a war between the same city and the Powers of Good, who struggle to regain it for the Kingdom to which it rightly belongs.

Bunyan says that *human nature* is like a city, with its population occupied in their various trades, professions, and callings, and its town clerk, mayor, magistrates, and other officers of government. Just as different kinds of work have to be carried on, if the city is to prosper, some having the authority of managers, and others having to carry out the plans of the managers, and order has to be

kept and the affairs of the city looked after by its government—so each of us has a great number of different kinds of wants, desires, impulses, thoughts, and feelings, which have to be kept in order. Some of them have rightful authority over others; some need to be kept strictly under control, others to have free play. And if they are to be kept in order there must be a central controlling authority—a *government*.

The greatest difference among our impulses and desires is that some are higher than others, and ought to rule. How do we know that they are higher? Because when we act on them they lead to the greater good; their effects make for greater good in ourselves and others.[1]

Where is the government, the central controlling authority, in 'Mansoul'—in your own nature? It is *yourself*, in your power to think—to think about what you are doing and why you want to do it. A woman once said, excusing herself, 'But, doctor, I did not think.' 'Madam,' he replied, 'you have no business not to think.' That is true of us all. And when we try to think about what we are doing, we begin to see which of our feelings

[1] See above, Chapter II, pp. 15, 17.

and desires ought to rule, and we can make them rule. This is *self-control*.

To be entirely without self-control, would be to yield to whatever want or feeling happened to be uppermost in your mind at the moment, without a thought of the consequences even to yourself. Have you noticed a moth or fly dashing itself into the flame? It has no foresight of the harm it will do to itself, and after burning itself once will do it again and again until it is killed. Some people act almost in this way. They do a thing simply because they like it, and do not care whether it is dangerous or harmful to themselves or to anyone else.

People are not always speaking about self-control under this name; but some of the commonest sayings and proverbs have reference to it, such as 'think before you speak,' 'look before you leap.' The harm done by the want of it extends through the whole of life in things great and small. You see the perils of its absence not only in the drunkard or the criminal—not only in the man who has destroyed his character or wrecked his life. What does the lack of 'presence of mind' come from, the tendency to rush wildly to a decision, or the sheer inability to decide at all (at a moment of danger, for example, when

prompt action is essential), or the contented yielding to mental and moral sloth and indolence ?

Self-control is what keeps the city in order, with all its different parts working together, and each one doing its part in its proper place. Evil arises when one part of us breaks out of bounds and obtains a share in our lives to which it has no right. We are not called upon to cut away any of our natural and harmless desires and instincts—even if some of them are only for bodily comfort, and things beautiful and attractive in our homes and surroundings. They only become bad when they are given more importance than they deserve—worst of all when they are made as if they were the chief things worth living for. For, then, they stand in the way of our obtaining things worth a thousand times more than they—such qualities as those of which St. Paul was thinking when he said, 'Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honourable, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report—if there be any virtue and anything worthy of praise, *think* on these things.' These are the things of which true manhood is made; and before them, all else must give way.

Our work of to-day

Many religious and moral teachers, some of them great men, have thought that our life consists of two parts—one all earthly and evil, the other all heavenly and good. All wants and desires belonging to the earthly life are to be uprooted and destroyed; our true and rightful life is the heavenly one. The earthly life at its best cannot be anything but a purification—a getting rid of evils. The men and women who believed this to be the truth about life, treated all the wants of our bodily life with special severity: the flesh was to be 'mortified,' that is, the wants of the body suppressed as far as possible. This was what led many of them to 'retire from the world'—as they called it—into monasteries or convents, and many others to take up the life of hermits, away from all the haunts of men, in caves or rough dwellings, where they lived on the coarsest food, and endured privations of all kinds.

This view of life prevailed in the Middle Ages, and still survives in Roman Catholic, and even in some kinds of Protestant, teaching. The late Canon Liddon, preaching in St. Paul's Cathedral in London, once pleaded that the heavenly world is just as much a reality as the world in which we now

live, or far more a reality, and hence that common prudence calls upon us to make some adequate preparation for it, even though the preparation should involve neglect in using the various resources and capacities of this life. He compared our life to a pilgrimage to another world—a 'pilgrimage' in which we must of necessity leave undeveloped many of earth's most glorious treasures, forgo many most interesting experiences, be ready to enrich the soul at the cost of the intellect and the body, and carefully restrain and check some of the far-wandering mundane impulses even of benevolence itself.

There are grave reasons for believing that such a life would involve neglect of many plain duties in the present world, and that it would not be the best preparation even for the world beyond the grave. It would mean much self-sacrifice, indeed; but for what? For no earthly good, high or low; for the sake of standing aloof from the world's troubles, and making life a meditation on death; for the sake of cultivating an apathetic indifference to all the living interests that bind us to our fellow-men; for the sake of another world of which nothing can be known, or even intelligently spoken, save that it is an escape, a

deliverance, a rescue, from this world. This spirit has had its day and done its work. Instead of it, the world now needs human heroism ; instead of monks and hermits, heroes. Heroism means self-sacrifice ; but it is self-sacrifice for a noble aim to be accomplished, here and now.

When you hear of 'heroism,' you naturally call to mind great deeds on the battle-field, or in some of the world's great struggles, because these are written about and remembered ; but do not forget that heroic deeds are done every day, and all around us, which we never see. Every act by which some stumbling-block is removed, some rock of offence overthrown—if it be only to restrain a hasty word, or guard some small besetting sin—is, in its own measure, an heroic act. Such are the small sacrifices which we are called upon to perform every day. These stand at one end of the scale ; at the other, stand heroes like Father Damien, giving his life for the lepers he loved, and like the men who perished in the wreck of the 'Birkenhead,' who stood at the word of command, and went down with the ship into a sea that was full of sharks, sooner than endanger the lives of the women and children, saved in the boats.

Every genuine sacrifice is one which has a noble purpose in it. Nothing that has the least

good in it need be simply thrown away, unless to prepare the way for something better. Nothing is 'common or unclean' unless it hinders some one from growing into the true human life for which he was made. Hence the right spirit is not that which tries to cut itself loose from the world; it is the heroism which overcomes the evils of the world. Thomas Hughes, in his fine book on "The Manliness of Christ," has reminded us of this in words well worth remembering. 'The daily life of every one of us teems with occasions which will try the temper of our courage—try it as searchingly (though not as terribly) as battle-field, or fire, or wreck. We are born into a state of war, with falsehood, and disease, and wrong, and misery in a thousand forms, lying all around us; with the heroes of every age and country calling on us to take our stand like men in the eternal battle against these things.'

Bodily Life

One of the greatest applications of what we have said, both of self-control and self-sacrifice, is to the *bodily life*. What claims has your body on you? Most people are eager enough about the pleasures of the body, especially the lower ones; but do they know what the claims

of the body really are, or how to train the body and its powers as well as possible ?

Some one may ask, are not the claims of the mind and character higher than those of the body ? Of course they are ; but your body is the instrument of your mind, and just for that reason ought to be made as perfect as possible for its proper uses. A man may ask, 'Am I under any *obligation* to attend to the rules of health ? Have I not a right to eat and drink what I please, to get sick or keep well or die if I please ? ' You have no such right. You are under the highest obligation to keep your body as a machine in as good repair as possible, to have it possess as much power as possible, that you may use this power for good, for the help of the world. You have no business to disregard it, treat it badly, or disable it. And because the mind uses the body, if the body is neglected or diseased, our mental life may suffer severely and often does.

Of the rules of health this is not the place to speak fully ; though most of us will only learn them at our cost by the results of disregarding them. Two things must, however, be mentioned : not because you do not know them quite well, but for the sake of showing where their importance really lies.

The first is *cleanliness*. A body defiled by

dirt lies open to the attacks of disease just as an ill-fortified camp in a hostile country lies open to the attacks of the enemy. The second is *exercise.* Our bodily powers are healthy when used, and not used too much. In their right use lies a great source of harmless and healthy pleasure. And the almost instinctive demand for such exercise, on the part of young men in particular, is sound. Interest in athletics, when not carried too far is thoroughly good. By 'interest in athletics' I do not mean reading the so-called 'sporting papers,' or going to watch two teams of paid men play your football for you; I mean *playing it yourself.*

But with every exercise, activity, and desire of the bodily life, there comes, soon or late, and sometimes very soon, a limit beyond which you must not go. It is because you are rational beings, and not brute beasts, that the appeal is made to you ever to be ready to think, and see what these limits are. 'It is only too easy to be tempted by the pleasure of doing some one thing to overdo it, and strain and ruin not only the power we are exercising, but often our whole lives in neglecting more important things. *There is one class of bodily activities in regard to which this danger is specially great.* In common with all other animals, we are subject to

two great impulses, which arise within us: the impulse to eat and drink, by which we are driven to do that which is necessary to live at all—and the impulse to secure the continuance of our race. These we may call the appetites of the body. It is not for us to say that these appetites are evil, so long as they are controlled by reason and conscience, and kept within due limits. But these of all our powers and impulses need to be most carefully watched and controlled. For while the pleasures they bring are most seductive, the consequences of over-indulging in them are most terrible. Ruin lies in store for the man or woman who indulges them in excess. The glutton, the drunkard, the sensualist, stand to us as terrible warnings of the danger which lies before us, if we allow one side of our nature, and that the lowest, to get out of bounds and break up the harmony of our being.'[1]

[1] The reader will find in Mr. John Dendy's book, "Successful Life," chapters xviii and xix, 'Friendship and Marriage,' and 'The Sex Question,' a good indication of the manner in which these difficult questions may be brought before a class of adolescents or adults.

Source of Self-control

The self-control on which our moral life depends is a real possibility for us all. To have utterly lost that possibility is to have sunk to utter insanity, or to a condition worse than the beasts of the field.

There is a great question arising here, which must be faced. What is the source of your self-control? I said it was yourself in your own power of *thinking*. This is what is meant by saying that you are *morally free*. You have before you a real and tremendous possibility: either to control the lower springs of action which appeal to you, or to yield up yourself, your character, and perhaps your life, to their deadly influence.

Sometimes when people speak of moral freedom, they really mean moral perfection—they are thinking of the condition of being *free from* all inducements to evil. We know by experience that when a man masters his passions and builds up within himself a better life, his possibilities of being and doing evil grow less. He is moving towards a condition where evil ceases to appeal as a possible motive. This gives us a meaning of moral freedom, in which it is an ideal, something after which we may aspire rather than an actual quality which we possess. In the end, such freedom is another

name for the total perfection of human nature ; a Perfect Being alone is free, in this meaning of the word.

But in order that this Ideal freedom, the freedom which is beyond the possibility of doing evil, may ever be attained *by us*, our actions, in the life we are living now, must involve *real possibilities*. This gives us the second meaning of moral freedom, the meaning that we are looking for.

Now no one denies that our actions *appear* to be free—that when you contemplate a decision there seems to be real alternative possibilities before you. There is, however, a very important theory of life, called Determinism, which declares that this is an appearance only, due to the fact that you know only a small part of the circumstances on which your decision depends. The Determinist who knows what he is about, never denies that our actions appear to be free ; he admits that we are conscious of freedom ; but he really means that we are *unconscious* of the conditions which make our every act inevitable.

In repudiating this, and affirming real possibilities, what exactly do we mean ? Imagine yourself about to decide on a course of action after thinking about it. The Determinist says that your decision, when it comes, is the

necessary result of circumstances which already exist; the conditions which completely determine it are already there, so that only one result is possible. And if you had complete knowledge of the case, you would see what you call your conduct moving along a line already marked out in advance.

The believer in freedom says that not all the conditions, on which your decision depends, exist already. Most of them exist already, but not all. The circumstances of the outward world, and your life in it, are there; your own self is there—a growing self, with some of its characteristics formed into definite dispositions, habits, tendencies, but in many other ways unformed, plastic, variable, and in every way incomplete and imperfect, like a seed, a germ, a potency; both world and self are there, grounded in the eternal laws which may be disregarded but never evaded. On all these your decision depends, for they have offered to you an alternative to decide. What is the last condition required to make the decision real—the last condition, which does not yet exist? It is an act from and of yourself; an act which no one else, not even God, can do *for you*; a creative act, which brings some-

thing new into being; another turning-point in your ever-growing self.

An act of 'will,' it is called, or an act of 'attention'; but these may be included in a more pregnant designation. In concrete reality it is *active thinking*. To think, to hold an idea before the mind until it becomes part of yourself and issues in action, is the only moral act. Imagine an exhausted sailor on a wreck. 'One of his ideas is that of his sore hands, of the nameless exhaustion of his whole frame which the act of further pumping involves, and of the deliciousness of sinking into sleep. The *other* is that of the hungry sea engulfing him. "Rather the aching toil!" he says; and it becomes reality then, in spite of the obstructive influence of the luxurious sensations which he gets from lying still.' To hold that thought of the hungry sea, and what it means, is enough; the action follows. Both alternatives appeal to him; but because he has the power to think of its meaning, the one appears to him more desirable and better than the other. It is not otherwise when we have any moral problem before us; to 'resist temptation' is to hold the thought of the better course and of what it means. This power to think, and to control our thinking, constitutes the real possibility of self-

reform, and in fact opens up all the spiritual possibilities of humanity.

It is because the present and the past of the world are in certain ways really and definitely *bad* that this question of real possibilities is so deeply important. If the future is the necessary result of the past, it cannot be better than the past. The only hope for the world's salvation is that actions and events shall come into being which are not the inevitable product of the present and the past. Our doctrine of Freedom means that in certain crises our actions are additions to the previous total of existence in space and time—new things, which make a difference to the world. This doctrine has a backward look, for it tells us that certain things not only ought to have been but could have been otherwise; but the entire value of the doctrine lies in its forward look. True, it means the possibility that some beings may for a while go wrong; but along with the possibility of partial failure, it brings in the most powerful preventive that can enter into the soul of man—the conviction that success, even complete success, is gloriously possible. It does not set us brooding helplessly over the unalterable past; it tells us that we, you and I and all, have the power to fulfil our share

of the charge laid on humanity to-day; 'to build the old wastes, to raise up the former desolations, even the desolations of many generations'—'to proclaim liberty to the captives, and the opening of the prison to them that are bound.'

Chapter VI

WORK AND PLAY

IT is still one of the great delusions of the world to suppose that people are well-off, happy, to be envied, when they are delivered from the necessity of *work*.

We can trace out a few facts, in the past history of the human race, which throw light on some of the ways in which this matter is regarded at the present time. At the beginning, when human life was only a little higher than that of the four-footed animals, when men did not even hunt animals for food, but lived on such fruits or nuts, or shell-fish on the shore, as they could most easily gather, then there could scarcely have been any recognition of different kinds of work for different persons, nor perhaps any recognition of the difference between work and play. But when their life rose higher in the

scale, and they began to want more things and better things, and to think more about things, then great changes took place.

To begin with, the needs of life increased, and the work of providing for them was turned over to certain people. There was first the hunter, and soon the necessity appeared for the warrior. But work in the sense of *drudgery* was done by neither of these. It was turned over to the women, who could not hunt or fight, or to such members of the tribe as were physically incapable of the rougher or what were looked upon as the nobler exercises.

Before a great while, however, the spirit of invention and improvement appeared. 'The things that men needed in those days, as they do now, besides food, were clothing, shelter, weapons, tools. There were persons who applied to these a certain amount of taste and skill; and a certain amount of honour began to be given to those who were able to excel in making these things. Such a one did not occupy the supposed high rank accorded to the chief, to the great fighter, or to the distinguished hunter, yet he was somewhat above the drudge, the ordinary labourer.'

There was a time when the fighter and the hunter (especially the hunter) were

honoured most because they were most necessary—the one providing protection, the other food. It appears that once in the history of the Hebrews hunting came to be regarded as a religious exercise—in the case of Nimrod; and so the saying grew up, 'like Nimrod, a mighty hunter before the Lord.' As civilization advanced, fighting and hunting became less and less useful; at the present time hunting and related pursuits have become almost entirely mere amusements. But the notion that these and similar useless occupations are 'the proper thing' for what some persons call a 'gentleman,' is only a relic from those far-away barbarian days; so is the notion that a person who is delivered from taking part in the useful work of the world is superior *because of that fact* to those who are not so exempted. There was a man who became rather famous in his time, who defined a gentleman as a person 'without any visible means of support,' meaning, of course, without any necessity to work for his living. The man who held this opinion was one of the meanest scoundrels exposed in recent times—the claimant in the Tichborne case. 'What is your idea of a gentleman?' is a good question for each person to answer for himself.

The distinction between occupations sup-

posed to be honourable and work regarded as common or menial played a great part in the life of the ancient world, and has bequeathed to us some of our ideas on the subject. In ancient times it was closely connected with the institution of *slavery*. Slaves were prisoners of war.[1] In more savage days these were slaughtered or tortured to death; afterwards they were kept as slaves. In Greece and Rome all that we call the hard work of the world, the disagreeable work, was performed by slaves. But there were certain ones who had to share it with them. And those who did the kind of work which slaves also performed, had to share the degradation attaching to the slavish condition—the condition of the man who does 'menial' work.

During the Middle Ages, while the menials were in a position of complete servitude, and those who laboured on the soil were in no better case, there were many groups of *skilled workmen* who improved their position by forming what were called Guilds. The Guilds were organizations of the goldsmiths

[1] Slavery in ancient times had an origin entirely different from that of the commercial slavery which existed in modern times—in the United States of America, for example.

and other great classes of workmen for their own protection. They obtained better wages for their toil, had more honour attached to their occupations, and in all ways lifted themselves in the scale of life. But the substantial honour which the world had to give was not given to the workers.

I have mentioned these facts simply as illustrations of historical causes accounting for some of the ideas which still survive—particularly the tendency to honour and envy the man who does not need to work. In using the word *worker*, I refer not only to those who work with the hands but also to those who work with the brain. During the last five hundred years we can trace in the world the persistent effects of the prejudice which assigns the highest rank to the prosperous idler and sets a certain dishonour on work. In recent years the struggle to 'make money,' the race for wealth, has created a kindred prejudice which assigns the highest honour to the man who has made most money, irrespective of his character or worth to the world.

Differences between Work and Play

What is the difference between work and play? All we need is to form such an idea of the difference as will suit our purpose here.

The worker is not simply the man who puts forth energy, who struggles or strives. For much that is called 'sport,' 'play,' 'recreation,' 'amusement,' requires very severe effort and often severe training. It is needless to give examples. From the schoolboy upwards, people count it a hardship to expend in 'work' one tenth part of the energy and force which they gladly expend in 'play.'

When you try to get to the root of the matter, you find that the difference between work and play does not lie in the thing that is done. The same thing may be work in one set of circumstances and play in another. The difference lies rather in the purpose for which it is done. 'Work' is the putting forth of effort not 'for its own sake' (for the joy or delight of the exercise) nor for the honour to be achieved by it (as in the winning of a game or a race), but because we are 'obliged to do it.' Yes, but why 'obliged'? It may be that a man voluntarily incurs the obligation because he sees so clearly and feels so strongly that the thing *needs* doing;

or the obligation may arise because we must do that thing in order to 'make a living.' Of course, both kinds of obligation may and often do work together; and practically we may say that any human effort is *work* if it receives a money reward which is to purchase the necessaries of life, and *good work* if it is useful to the world.

Work makes a change in the world, and it makes a change in the worker too. This latter change is the most important of all. It is part of the great general law of life, that there can be no growth without effort and exercise. This is true of every gift, faculty, and power of ours. The child grows to be a man only because of the energy it puts forth; and activity and effort alone can improve the man. You know this well enough about muscular work. It is just as true of brain work. Thinking develops the brain, increases its power; and the strengthened brain makes new and clearer thoughts possible. Physical work makes the man physically fit, and mental work makes him mentally fit. Work makes the artist, the musician, the author, the philanthropist. Work is a condition of all the highest and finest things of which we can dream; and the man who is delivered from the necessity of work is thereby sentenced

to mediocrity, sentenced to a condition of undeveloped personality and power.

And while work changes and improves the worker, it also changes and improves the world. We can trace this even in the distant past.

Some of the most interesting discoveries, in the way of relics of the human race in its earliest state, are specimens of attempts at drawing, found by modern men in caves and elsewhere, preserved for tens of thousands of years. These show that the first attempts at art consisted in scratching with some sharp instrument (perhaps a flint) on the tusk of an elephant or the bone of some large animal, or in making rude figures on the wall of a cave. It was the dawn of the sense of beauty, the feeling that many things in the world were fine to look at and that it would be well to picture them as well as to remember them. But the attempt to express the sense of beauty increased until it demanded better things—something finer and more beautiful. So step by step the advance was made until, from the rude beginnings of which I have spoken, you have the wonderful creations in painting and sculpture which men accomplished in later times. The power of the workers and the results of their work alike grew greater *because and only because they tried.*

Perhaps this art-illustration will not appeal to every one. Then turn your thoughts to what we call civilization, and the discovery and invention on which it depends. Ten thousand years ago this earth was a jungle, inhabited by barbarous tribes dragging out a precarious existence by the seashore or the banks of rivers or lakes, exposed to all kinds of danger from wild beasts and from their own ignorance and inexperience. Contrast with this the world as man has subdued it to his purposes to-day. The difference between the world then and the world now corresponds to the difference between man then and man now. The world has been transformed externally and man transformed within by the labour which has enabled him to accomplish these results—labour of brain and of hand, of the men who thought and planned and the men who executed.

Or open an elementary textbook on science —Geology or Astronomy, for instance. You can buy it for a shilling and children can learn it. But the simple statements of fact contained in it are the result which centuries of toil and effort have accomplished—centuries of struggle, persecution, pain, and death, endured by successive generations of men.

Worker and Idler

When you realize all this, our infinite debt to the labour of the men and women of the past, you realize the position of the man who, not being compelled to work, does not do anything. It will mark a step upwards in the progress of the world when such a man is regarded with general disfavour and contempt, whatever his so-called rank in life may be.

Some men have the inner impulse to work even without the pressure of outward necessity ; but they are not the majority. The compulsion is a blessing rather than a curse. And the presence of an idle rich class, delivered from any such compulsion, is, from the point of view of economic science, no use whatever to the country, and from the moral point of view is a public danger. I do not speak of the rich who give themselves, in some genuine way, to the public service or the general welfare. I speak of those who are unchivalrous fainéants in relation to the social and political problems which press for solution ; and above all of those who are content, in heartlessness and selfishness, to give themselves up to the thoughtless pursuits and conventions of their ' set.'

These people not only injure themselves, as a finely-made and complicated machine

would be injured if it became rusty and worthless through disuse. They fail to fulfil one of the first conditions of an honest life. I quote a judgment on this matter, uttered in the hearing of a large and wealthy audience in New York, which I believe you will feel to be entirely just :—

'The world in this twentieth century has laid up in store what seems an enormous aggregate of accumulated wealth, so that it would seem we are far from poverty. But, if we should cease the production of the means for living, the world would begin to starve within two or three years at the very furthest. It is only continual and practically universal work, then, that keeps the world living, keeps it going. I say, then, that the man who does not work must necessarily fail to put anything into the world's wealth. If he does not by productive work of brain or hand put in at least an equivalent for what he takes out for his own use, he is a thief—I care not what his position in the world may be. He may be unconscious of the fact, but fact it is. And if a man wishes to be a little better than merely to escape the accusation of being a thief, he will try to put back into the common stock a little more than he takes out. He will want to leave the world not poorer than

it was when he was born; and so he will add a little to its store because he has been living in it.' Rendering some equivalent, adding to the world's welfare in some way, is the only honest condition for any human being.

Useful labours, mental and bodily

It is a very mischievous and stupid mistake to restrict the meaning of 'labour' to hand-labour. There is scarcely any end to the variety of ways in which useful work may be done; and no small part of it is done voluntarily and without payment. This I have already pointed out. There are men and women who are not compelled to work, who do more useful work for the world than many who work for pay. I gave some hints of this when speaking of the many institutions which have arisen to help the helpless (chapter IV, page 48).

It is worth our while just to glance at some of the varieties of useful labour. They all consist in the *production and distribution of wealth*. When we say this, we mean by 'wealth,' not money, but *useful things*; and the things are 'useful' either because they serve mainly the mental, the intellectual, and spiritual side of life, or because they serve mainly the bodily or material side. Of course

the world takes for granted that the only real wealth is material wealth. It is, as Emerson said—'*Things* are in the saddle, and ride mankind'; although at the same time, everybody who stops to think knows quite well that *the only real wealth is mental and spiritual wealth*—that is, at bottom, *true manhood*. For what does it practically mean, when men deprive themselves, or are deprived, of this real wealth? The practical result is that they are unintelligent and immoral; and material wealth, in the hands of unintelligent and immoral men, only makes them worse than they would be without it. For this reason we say that the labour of teachers, scientific workers, and reformers, of great writers and thinkers, of poets, artists, and musicians, is a true production of wealth.

Only as a means to this true wealth or *welfare* (which is the original meaning of the word 'wealth') has the production of material wealth any value.

Material wealth consists at bottom of the products of the earth, through mining and cultivation of the soil, made available for human use by all the many kinds of skilled trades and manufactures and by the distribution and exchange of the products through the vast organization of commerce, or 'business';

every branch of this multitudinous labour involving as much of brain-labour, in planning and directing, as it does of hand-labour.

And over and above all this, there is all that is involved in Government—political work, in that older and more honourable sense of the word 'politics' in which it means not scheming for the interests of a party, but the responsible conducting of public affairs, making laws and putting them into effect. All these many kinds of work, from that of the Urban Councillors to that of the Ministers of State, from that of policemen to that of judges, belong to the useful and indispensable labours of the world.

Mischievous Labour

The work we have been speaking of is 'useful effort.' For there are things which are certainly work, and which it pays to carry on; but their results are directly harmful to the world, even within the limits of what is legal. It pays to run a gin-palace; it pays to get up a great circulation for 'yellow' journals, miscalled newspapers, full of 'snippets' and sensation, requiring neither attention nor thought to read; it pays to circulate worthless and harmful books; it pays sometimes to specu-

late and gamble in stocks and shares, though by money made thus, nothing is added to the welfare of the world; it pays to start dishonest Limited Liability Companies; a lawyer may make money by promoting strife, a preacher by talking sensational nonsense or falsehood, a Government officer by misusing the powers of his position for himself and his party.

Even without going so far as these directly mischievous and hurtful enterprises, work may produce untold harm simply because it is badly done. A bad workman is to that extent a bad man, no matter what the worldly rank of his work may be. The man who lays a drain as well and thoroughly as it can be done, is a far more useful and honourable member of society than many a financier, merchant, lawyer, or preacher. But to lay a drain so that it shall be a breeding-place for fever, is to inflict suffering and danger on nobody knows how many persons far and near.

Somebody once said that evil begets evil. This matter of workmen scamping their work is an example of it. For there are many employers and masters—among those who have not oppressed their workmen nor ground them down—who by their actual experience have been led to believe that the average work-

man carries on his work in the worst possible spirit, does as little as he can, wastes time, and works badly in every way that is possible for him. To bring such a charge against British working men as a whole class would be absurd; but there is just enough truth in it to make it a fruitful source of mischief. For example, it is one of the greatest barriers in the way of securing a really sympathetic interest in the aims of the Labour Party. Employers who have had the experience of which we speak can point to actual facts in support of their opinions. Of course there are excuses to be made for the workmen. But that is not the point. The workmen have duties as well as rights. The point is that it is as foolish as it is immoral for them to attempt to secure their rights by neglecting their duties. Though the settlement of the wages lies between master and man, the work does not. It is and must be done for the world. Others depend on its being well and faithfully performed, and suffer if it is not.

The wages are a matter of bargaining between master and man, and the men are quite right to stand out for the best terms that they can get. But the bargain once made, they are bound to fulfil their part of it as well and thoroughly as they can.

Nothing but evil comes of caring little about the work you do compared with the pay or profit you are to get for it. We have contrasted 'work' and 'play' more than once; there is one point in which they might be made to resemble one another more than they do. Ruskin has reminded us of this in plain words. 'I hardly know anything more strange than that you recognize honesty in play and you do not in work. In your lightest games you have always some one to see what you call "fair play." In boxing you hit fair; in racing you start fair. Your English watchword is fair play; your English hatred, foul play. Did it ever strike you that you wanted another watchword also, fair work, and another hatred also, foul work? Your prize-fighter has some sense of fair play in him yet, and so have the men in the ring round him; they will judge him to lose the match by foul hitting; but your prize merchant gains his match by foul selling, and no one cries out against that. You drive a gambler out of the gambling-room who loads dice, but you leave a tradesman in flourishing business who loads scales!' And this, although short weight is the least fault of this kind. Adulterated substance or dishonest fabric are incomparably worse. Give me short measure of food, and I only lose by

you, but give me adulterated food and I die by you.

Is compulsion to work, an evil?

I now come back to the opinion which I spoke of at the beginning, that the compulsion to work is an evil, if not a 'curse' inflicted on humanity. There are no reasons for such opinion, but there are causes which account for it. These consist mainly of the following facts: first, that the work of the world is badly distributed, so that a vast number have to work far too hard for their daily bread, and very many more or less useless people are supported by the labour of others; and, second, that there is not enough really useful work done (however well its products were divided) to keep all in a satisfactory condition of comfort and well-being.

The great law of work, for us, is expressed in the ancient phrase *noblesse oblige*, once the proud boast of knighthood and chivalry; which in its reference to our modern life we may translate *ability is obligation*. You are under the strictest obligation to do for the world what you can. What it is, will depend partly upon health, natural ability, and other things about which you had little or no choice; but none the less, some gift, some talent, is

yours which marks out something in the world given you to do.

There are real *hardships of labour*; but they do not make labour only a 'necessary evil.' All of us who have any kind of work to do, feel them. They form three connected groups of facts. Perhaps it will do us good to look them in the face, and to think about them as well as merely feel them.

First: Different kinds of work are not all of the same value to the world. Human desire creates market-value. If there is a thing which nobody wants, it has no value. If many want it, it has value; but if it is limited in supply, its market-value rises; if there is a great deal of it, its value falls.

Second: all men are not by nature fitted to do all kinds of work; there is a natural and inevitable inequality in the abilities of men and hence in the work they can do. Sir Isaac Newton and his gardener were both examples of useful workmen; yet what a difference between them! No one else could have done Newton's work, which has been of immense practical value to the world; but thousands of men could have done the gardener's work. The poorest and most mechanical kind of work, requiring the least of brains, is perfectly indispensable—it must be done: such

is the work of the dock-labourer, for instance. Such work is the worst paid. Why? Because for one man who can do the better kind of work there are a hundred or a thousand who can do the poorer kind.

Third: all kinds of work do not develop the higher human qualities of the man. Constant and unchanging hand-work, monotonous and mechanical, tends to deaden the man's mental powers and makes him like a brainless machine.

One among the many evil results of these things is, that many men do not even have the chance of doing the work that they are fitted for and would love to do. They have to spend their lives in task-work along unchosen lines.

We cannot escape the consequences of all these facts that I have mentioned. But that is no reason why we should make their consequences worse by our own follies. And the greatest folly of all is to allow ourselves to sink down into the belief that all the hardships of our lot are the fault of other men and of circumstances, and that we are helpless victims. That is just what no man, simply because he is a man, ever can be. Even if all the world is against him, there is something, however little, that he can do to make his lot more endurable than it is.

It is true that we live in the midst of these inevitable hardships, these that are not the fault of any human misdeeds—the want of the world, the stress of temptation, the weakness trampled down, the sufferings bodily and mental which grow out of the fact that man is only partially civilized and has only half-learned to adapt himself to the laws according to which the world is made. But we also live face to face with our heritage from the past—our civilization and attainments, which have sprung from a rugged soil worked by the age-long effort on the part of men and women, and watered by blood and tears—and which, poor as they are, are a charge handed down to us to be used for its best and made better. And we live face to face with the great uncompleted ideal of humanity which is not yet part of our life but ought to be and shall be; and these things are to us an everlasting call to labour, to do something for our fellows, to lift them up and help them on.

Excesses in Play

All that I have said confirms the judgment which we expressed before. He who does not recognize the law of labour that binds him to his fellows and makes it part of the first moral duty of his life to do something to uplift and

help, fails to fulfil the first condition of an honest life.

The worst example of such a failure is the life of the man or woman who goes through the world simply looking for something in the way of enjoyment, with no thought for anything but to find means of amusement in that so-called 'society' which is only another name for a life of nothing but play. What is the difference between such a one and the 'loafer' who lounges round the public-house corner hoping to be asked in by some one to have a drink?

Severe, however, as our judgment must be upon a life which is all play, it is the simple truth that the play-principle has a deep foundation in the real needs of our life. To play, as we hinted before, is to do something just for the pleasure we feel in doing it; and the true play-principle is that of recreation—creating over again, making good again, enlivening or building up something that has suffered damage or exhaustion.

Play is found throughout all nature; through the whole of animal life, and even in the inanimate world, in the beauty of the earth, the source of the joy that has no other purpose but just to be felt. And play is one of our 'instincts,' one of the things which come

'naturally' to us to do without thinking of any reason why we do them.

About two hundred and fifty years ago, when the men who were called Puritans were powerful in England and in the New England States of North America, the endeavour was made to put down all amusements. They looked upon the play-instinct as something not to be controlled or guided but to be rooted out. A favourite and cruel amusement of that time was 'bear-baiting'; and it is said that the Puritans opposed and fought against bear-baiting not because it hurt the bears but because of the amusement it gave the people. In still earlier times there was a widespread feeling that all the amusements, passions, and pleasures of life were bad; and many of the best people retired into monasteries and convents, and left the common work of the world to be carried on by people of inferior character. Now all this was never wholly false; it was a great and dangerous exaggeration of something that is for ever true—the shame and disgrace of a life devoted all to play.

We can see the causes of the exaggeration, too. 'There was a grand meaning,' it has been well said, 'in Puritanism when it stood up firmly to fight against the licentiousness of

King Charles's Court'; and there was a grand meaning in the protest made by Christians in earlier days against the gladiatorial shows and habits of licentiousness of the depraved and sinking civilization of Rome. But, none the less, the play-instinct of man is a natural instinct; and the expression of it in means for amusement is not only natural but right.

There are two ways in which amusements are made sources of serious evil. One way is by mingling them with evils that are no essential part of them, such as drinking, betting, and gambling, and worse things than these. The other way is by carrying them to excess: excess in hours, excess in energy, excess in outlay of money and means. Billiards, for instance, has been rightly described as 'one of the most beautiful games ever invented, educating to hand and eye, a matter of skill and nice discrimination, beautiful in itself.' But when there is a drinking-bar close at hand, and the element of betting is introduced, it becomes degrading in its whole nature and tendency—a place and a way to corrupt the young men of the town. And as regards dancing, 'the poetry of motion,' Mr. John Dendy says, in his book on "Successful Life": 'I remember once being taken to a notorious garden in Paris and into a close, hot room

there, ablaze with lights and decorations, where dancing was being carried on. There were many graceful and beautiful girls there, and men too, who had it in them to use their limbs to better purpose. Each seemed to be trying to outdo the others in indecent attitudes and performances, in senseless laughing and shouting. All, men and women alike, were drinking more than enough. They were not in the main what you would call bad people, mostly shop-girls and clerks trying to enjoy themselves. They were only playing; but what a sort of play it was! A very little time spent in watching them was enough. It was one of the saddest sights I ever saw. There was no true recreation there. In all great towns there is too much of such play going on.'

Even the vigorous open-air games, of which Englishmen are so proud and so fond, have been greatly spoilt. In this case it is by the growth of the custom of playing for money or money's worth in 'prizes.' The desire for gain or profit, and the spirit of a vigorous game of strength and skill, are entirely inconsistent with one another; and I appeal to actual experience when I say that the spirit of gain cannot mingle with true sport without poisoning it.

What is called 'professionalism' is another

thing which is reducing many of our best games to a farce. A crowning example of this is seen when several thousand people assemble to watch two teams of paid men play their football for them; or when credit is given, say to a county, for matches won by a team of paid cricketers, some of whom may have a very questionable right to represent the county at all.

Still, the fact remains that one of the worst of the evil things which the perverse ingenuity of men has associated with what would otherwise be harmless amusements, is gambling—and betting, which is essentially the same thing. The immorality of gambling lies just in this—it is getting without giving; it is a breach of the law of honesty—to take from another man's pocket, giving nothing in return. The mischievous excitement of the gambler, and the ruinous effects of the practice on character, home, and national life, are evident to all who have eyes to see.[1]

Games which afford a healthy outlet for friendly rivalry and emulation, and which even develop character in teaching us the importance of 'playing the game' and 'taking a defeat' in the right way, are ruined in such

[1] For a short but excellent treatment of this subject, I may refer to Mr. John Dendy's book, "Successful Life."

ways as we have spoken of, and made sources of evil.

We must repeat that even when cleared of all the harmful things which have been mingled with it, play is only a small part of life, though it is a necessary part. You have no right to waste, as thousands do, money and means and strength simply to gratify yourself in the way of excessive pleasure.

The right place of play in life ceases to be a very hard question to one who has grasped the principle which we have been using in this book from the beginning. Remember what you are, what kind of possibilities and capacities lie, as it were, slumbering in you, what you might be if nobly developed. Remember the call and the claim of the world upon you. Remember that the great purpose of life is to live worthily as men and women; and that work and play are only means to serve, to purify, to lift up, and help on the manhood and the womanhood.

Chapter VII

PATRIOTISM AND PUBLIC WORK

ALL genuine Patriotism is a form of Justice. But first we must notice, in passing, some other meanings of this word.

It is a word which has several different meanings. One of them belongs to the work of the Law Courts, where it is the duty of Magistrates and Judges to see that Justice is done in the cases brought before them, and that the Law is impartially administered. Other meanings come from connecting Justice specially with *equality*. I must remind you at once that no meaning of Justice which lays special stress on 'equality' can be practically useful, because of the *natural inequalities* among men. If all men were equal in intelligence, strength, and goodness, then to do justice to all would be a matter of little difficulty. But we have seen that there are

all sorts of inequalities. The actual difference between an ignorant and dull-minded peasant and a great statesman, poet, or thinker, is as great as used to be thought to exist between a slave and an emperor. In the former case it is of course a difference in mental power and experience; but the differences among men in moral character are almost equally great. And the man who thinks his own opinion as good as that of anyone else, is exactly what we mean by a 'fool.' It is because of these natural inequalities, that opportunities, even if 'equal' for all, are useless to many; and all men are not fit for 'equal responsibility' or 'equal freedom.'

Men are equal not in what they actually are, but in what they *can be*; just as our principle, all through, has been to value human beings not for what they are but for what they have it in them to become. This equality is 'ideal'; it is a consequence or result of the development to perfection of human nature. To assert 'equality' as the ideal of Justice, throws no light whatever on the practical means by which the true development of human nature may be helped.

Owing to the *actual inequalities* among men, we cannot treat all alike, since there is much more to love and honour in some than in others.

It would be the opposite of Justice to treat idle, ignorant, or vicious people in the same way in which we treat the industrious, intelligent, and virtuous. But, owing to their *ideal equality*, we try to uplift the idle, ignorant, and vicious, and help them to help themselves; and we are bound to give to all, such courteous behaviour and respectful feeling as is possible.

Another and wider meaning of Justice has come down to us from the ancient Greeks, among whom many thinkers were inclined to make Justice mean the *right relations* among men as they live together—resting on the fulfilment by each of his obligations to others in the national life of the country, and in organized society. This wide meaning we adopt; and we divide the subject into Patriotism and Social Justice.

The Beginnings of Patriotism

Nothing that can be called Patriotism begins until tribes or nations have a settled abode. I have already spoken of a state of things when men formed tribes, wandering from place to place. Such a tribe had no territory, land, or district, which it could call its own.

For instance, many of the North American Indians lived in this way; and we find plain

traces of a similar kind of life among the Hebrews before they settled in Canaan. A tribe of this kind is kept together by inherited fellow-feeling, and loyalty to one another, and to the 'chief.' Such a people may be *loyal*, but not yet *patriotic*. Loyalty is a feeling for a person or persons; men may be loyal to one another as members of the tribe, and to the chief as standing for the honour of the tribe, or as favoured by its gods. But when they have established themselves in a region whose boundaries are known and defined, and which, if need be, can be defended against attack, then the thought of 'our country' can begin to arise.

Patriotism, when it first appears, may be described as a 'territorial' feeling; while the loyalty of which I spoke is 'racial'—in other words, is a result of the fellow-feeling of people who believe that they belong together and have had the same origin. And where the conditions of race and of soil work together to inspire a people with both loyalty and patriotism, then you have the moral qualities of a great and permanent nation. In fact, that deep *national feeling* which we, in the present day, call patriotism, always includes racial loyalty. You can see the 'racial' and the 'territorial' feeling both in it. Some of

the finest and purest expressions of it are found in Shakespeare.

Once more unto the breach, dear friends, once more ;
Or close the wall up with our English dead !
. . . On, on, you noblest English,
Whose blood is fetched from fathers of war-proof !
Fathers that, like so many Alexanders,
Have in these parts from morn till even fought. . . .
Be copy now to men of grosser blood,
And teach them how to war !—And you, good yeomen,
Whose limbs were made in England, show us here
The mettle of your pasture ; let us swear
That you are worth your breeding ; which I doubt not,
For there is none of you so mean and base
That hath not noble lustre in your eyes.

King Henry V, Act iii, sc. 1.

This England never did, nor never shall,
Lie at the proud foot of a conqueror,
But when it first did help to wound itself.
. . . Nought shall make us rue,
If England to itself do rest but true.

King John, Act v, sc. 7.

These lines tell of the feeling of racial loyalty. In what follows, the feeling for the land itself, the 'island home,' is uttered :—

This royal throne of kings, this sceptered isle,
This earth of majesty, this seat of Mars,
This other Eden, demi-paradise ;
This fortress, built by Nature for herself,
Against infection and the hand of war ;
This happy breed of men, this little world ;
This precious stone set in the silver sea,
Which serves it in the office of a wall,

Or as a moat defensive to a house,
Against the envy of less happier lands;
This blessed plot, this earth, this realm, this England,
This land of such dear souls, this dear dear land,
Dear for her reputation through the world.

King Richard II, Act ii, sc. 1.

The feeling of attachment to the land is always strongest in those places where people are brought most intimately into relation with the land; dwellers in the mountains or by the sea, and above all the people of rugged coasts and mountainous islands, have always been renowned for love of country. None loves the barren mountain-side or boggy plain more than the peasant whose life is spent in wringing a miserable livelihood from them.

Value of Patriotism

I repeat, however, that patriotism, as a force in modern life, is both territorial and racial. Now there is a good deal of dispute as to the value of this feeling. It may be degraded into forms that are contemptible—and these are found among English people more than elsewhere. You can be patriotic without showing swaggering superiority to all foreigners; without imagining that it is the duty of our rulers to be always shaking their fists in the faces of other nations; without senseless rowdyism in

the streets, in time of war, or unmanly rejoicings over a defeated enemy, in time of victory. But setting aside all this barbaric insolence and insularity of sentiment—from which England has suffered more than enough—we find some who say that patriotism is narrow prejudice, and that free men should be 'cosmopolitan.'

This word implies citizenship of *the world*, not of any particular country. This feeling that national patriotism is hopeless and useless was very strong for two or three centuries after Christ, when national feeling was crushed under the great world-empire of Rome. So we find some of the Fathers of the early Church saying: 'We recognize one commonwealth—the world'; and 'We have a fatherland invisible, founded on the Word of God.' Such beliefs were, so to speak, in the air at that time. You remember St. Paul's remark when addressing the Greeks at Athens: 'As certain of your poets have said, *we are also his offspring*'—children of a Divine Father. The quotation was probably from a famous hymn written by a leading thinker among the Stoics (a party of thinkers who were represented among those listening to St. Paul). They taught that all men belong to a common brotherhood, which overrides all distinctions of Greek and bar-

barian, male and female, bond and free. All are born to be citizens of one Divine kingdom, and as they live righteously and truly, they make themselves citizens of this 'city of God.'

Every one feels that there is something fine and true in these ideas; and they have been revived with much force in recent times, especially by the great Russian writer Tolstoy.

Now the people who find fault with patriotism at the present day usually do so because of what they make patriotism mean. They make it mean being ready to fight for one's country. A great deal of the sham or sentimental patriotism of our day does not rise even to that level. The patriotism of street 'maffickers' and blatant newspaper editors and journalists does not mean that these people are willing, or able, themselves to fight for their country; far from it. They want other men to do the fighting. But, setting this aside, the people who condemn patriotism specially connect it with *war*. Tolstoy says that all the miseries and horrors of war are the result of patriotism and nothing else.

Patriotism is Citizenship

It is true that part of the meaning of patriotism has always been—readiness to fight for one's country. And we shall agree that there are times when men ought to fight for their country. But to limit the meaning to this, is absurd, as you see at once when you ask will there be no room for patriotism when war is done away with for ever ?

Then, again, they tell you that in your judgment of what is right and wrong, patriotism prejudices you in favour of your own country ; that when patriotism begins to acquire a meaning *over and above loyalty to right* it begins to be unjust ; that you should stand out for what you believe in, whether it is in your own land or your enemy's. We can put all this in a sentence by saying that to act on the principle *my country, right or wrong* is bad. We agree ; and add that it is very stupid also. Why ? You might as well say 'my body, healthy or diseased,' meaning that its healthy or diseased condition does not matter to you. Of course it matters ; and the rightness or wrongness of your country's deeds matters even more to you, though in a more roundabout way.

For you are not only a subject or servant of your country ; you are a member of it. In your measure, you represent your country. The

public opinion of the British people is mainly responsible for the way the country is moving, and the way in which she stands to other nations. And public opinion is not a mysterious and abstract something with which you have nothing to do. It is merely the sum of all our opinions; and all of you have your share in forming it. Whether you will or no, you must either help or hinder the good. The coral 'insect' is extremely small, and yet by the work of myriads of these, whole islands have been built up from the sea floor; people build houses and plant trees and live their whole lives on the foundations laid by these minute organisms. So your share may be only a small one, but it is a real one; and *your* justice, *your* courage, *your* regard for mercy and truth will go to help lay the foundations for our England of a righteous and free life—a life free because righteous.

What then is the real mistake of our modern 'cosmopolitans,' which leads them to imagine that patriotism is nothing beyond a question of war? They forget one of the plain duties which faces every true man. They do not, indeed, forget how much depends on a man being a *good father* and a *good neighbour*; they forget how much depends on his being a *good citizen*, they forget even what this means.

What is a Good Citizen?

To be patriotic means to be a good citizen. Whatever else it may mean (in time of war, for instance), this is its first and great meaning. So our question is, What is involved in being a good citizen? What is a citizen?

To begin with, it is only in free countries that men can be citizens. Under a despotism, as in Russia, the people are 'subjects'; they can only obey and submit, or rebel at their peril.[1] But a citizen has *a share in the government of his country*. In a free country, government means the management of public business, public affairs—that is, those affairs which are too large, too widespread, too complicated, or too necessary for the public welfare, to be done by individual enterprise for private profit. Some of the most important of these, you will easily call to mind; but very few people realize how many there are. I will mention *a few of them*. The national government manages and provides for our international relations; for the army, navy, and dockyards; for the police and Courts of Justice; for the coinage and regulation of the currency and note issue; for

[1] We speak of 'British *subjects*'; but this is only a 'legal fiction,' coming down to us from times when the King or Queen personally and directly governed the country.

the post office, telegraphs (land and submarine), the carriage of mails and parcels; for savings banks, life-assurances, annuities, and investments up to limited amounts; for the conduct and inspection of schools and colleges; for lighthouses, life-boats, harbours, pilots, and ferries; for the regulation of weights and measures; for the carrying on of observations and researches in several branches of science. The national government and the local (municipal and county) governments combine to furnish and maintain gasworks, waterworks, tramways, allotments, artisans' dwellings, markets, schools, libraries, museums, parks, art-galleries, cemeteries, public baths; to make and enforce regulations in aid of public health; to make, clean, light, and repair, streets, roads, and bridges; to manage workhouses, relief, and other provisions for the poor. All these things and many more are done by the government for its citizens.

Hence the citizen has responsibilities and obligations over and above what belong to him as a member of a family, or even as a neighbour. What do we ask of Englishmen in the name of citizenship? I answer in the words of a wise observer of modern life: 'Not to neglect their families for local or parliamentary politics. Just the reverse—that is, to deepen their

family sentiment by remembering that home is after all an element in the common good of the community; that the wife and children are not playthings, nor animals to be fed, nor instruments of social and industrial advancement, but are members of a great nation, that has a past and a future, and relations of duty and participation in a common good, binding together all its citizens.' These responsibilities are all the greater because of the change which is gradually taking place in the power of the people. Government is no longer in the hands of a few families; wealth and rank are becoming less and less of a political power. The people at large cannot place on other shoulders the responsibility for acts to which they give a silent or an active consent. The South African war, for instance, whatever we think of its causes and effects, was the act of the people of England, deliberately sanctioned and supported by the vast majority of the citizens.

Obedience to the Laws

The first duty of the citizen is to obey the laws of his country.

In every civilized State there are published laws. Some of them are very old, and no one knows when they were first made; others

have been made by the Parliament or the King; others exist in the shape of decisions given by Judges in Law Courts, which remain as 'cases' for reference. These laws deal with all sorts of subjects—property, commerce, conduct. Some of them are the expressions of that 'experience of the human race' of which I spoke before,[1] and which has taught men what they *must not do* if they are to live together at all, and are to rise above the level of the ape and the tiger. There are many other ordinances and laws, however, still existing, which have been decreed by the rulers of the country in the course of its history, because experience has shown them to be necessary or because they serve the common convenience. Every Parliament which meets adds largely to their number.

Sometimes a law may seem to you unnecessary or trivial, or may prove inconvenient. Still, it is your business to obey it. No one has any right to put his personal preference or convenience before the laws which serve the public good.

The real difficulty about obeying the law arises in those cases—in England, fortunately, very rare ones—when a man is deliberately of opinion that a law is morally wrong. I quote

[1] See chapter II, p. 11.

some wise words of the late Richard Bartram about this. 'So long as it is the law a good citizen will respect it, and obey it, even if he be of opinion that it is a mischievous or an unrighteous law; though in that case he will do his best to get it repealed or altered. In this respect his *duty as an individual* and his *duty as a citizen* may clash. As an individual, he may feel bound, in obedience to his conscience and his reason, to refuse to do what the law commands; as a citizen, he has to bear in mind that other wills, other interests, other needs have to be consulted before he can do exactly as he thinks right. It may be right that his duty as a citizen should yield to his individual duty; it may be equally right that the latter should give way. This must be a question of conscience, upon which few are able to express an opinion except for themselves. Undoubtedly, many reforms have been effected, many iniquities swept away, by men and women who would never bow the knee to constituted authority, never accept the thraldom of any custom, however ancient, nor yield to any persuasion, however powerful, that did not receive the sanction of conscience. Whatever praise we may accord to these (oft-time) martyrs, they cannot claim to be ranked as good citizens. A *law-breaker* may of course be the cause of

better laws being made, but he is scarcely entitled to be called a *law-maker*.'

I must remind you of what we have agreed to understand by 'the sanction of conscience.' Conscience bids us act for *the good*; but whatever is good is good *for something*. Hence we judge actions by their effects on the development of character. Actions are good just in the degree in which they help us all to the most intelligent and most moral life that is possible. And if resistance to an unjust law does not give this best help, not only to the resister, but to all, it must be put on the same level as mere fanaticism and bigotry, when judged from the point of view of public welfare.

Two recent occasions for the application of these principles may be suggested. One is the so-called 'passive-resistance' of the Nonconformists who refused to pay the Education Rate that went partly in aid of Church-of-England teaching in Board Schools. The other is the (admittedly illegal) action of certain educated and refined women in their methods of agitating in order to force the British public to give serious attention to the claims for female enfranchisement. What is your judgment on these two cases?

Political Duties of the Citizen

In what follows I shall be speaking mainly about the citizen's duties as sharing in the government of his country—that is, his *political* duties. It needs not to be said that the duties of citizenship are by no means limited to this. It is the duty of a good citizen to do all he can to help to influence public opinion for good—the general opinion of the people with whom he is in touch. Not by general fussiness; but by taking whatever opportunity presents itself to him of working with others for good, outside his relations to his family and his personal business. For example: by taking his part in, or in support of, the societies representing his trade or profession; and by taking whatever part he can (consistently with his time and his means) in one or more of the religious, social, and charitable institutions by which he is surrounded, maintained as they usually are by voluntary self-sacrifice and toil falling most unfairly on a few.

I must, however, come back to the political duties of the citizen. I said that a citizen has a share in the government of his country. That means in making her laws. What kind of laws are good? Laws are good when not made in the interest of a trade, a party, or a class—unless it is a class specially needing pro-

tection, such as 'sweated' workers, or the children of immoral parents; laws are good when they ensure, not equality in the natures of men, which is impossible; but equality of all—rich and poor, peer and commoner, Churchman and Nonconformist—in their relations to the State.

How can any individual citizen influence the laws? In a small community, such as ancient Athens was among the Greeks, all the citizens could meet in the public place and personally take part in the discussion of public affairs. In modern countries, they can only do it through their elected representatives. The laws of England are practically made by 670 men, chosen by the male citizens from among themselves, constituting the House of Commons which is the supreme power in England and the Empire. I leave the House of Lords out of account here; for, save in a few exceptional cases, it criticizes and amends rather than initiates legislation; it is a revising body.

I may mention, in passing, the strange position in which English law leaves women. In one important respect (voting for representatives in Parliament) they are denied the full privileges of citizenship. A woman may be a queen (with as full rights as a king), a regent, or a peeress in her own right (with a seat in

the House of Lords, but no right of speaking or voting). She may be a Poor Law Guardian, a member of an Education Committee, a Factory Inspector, a Sanitary Inspector. If unmarried or a widow, she can vote in municipal, poor law, and other elections of a local character. Even if married, she can hold property in her own right and dispose of it by will or otherwise. But she cannot vote in a Parliamentary election.

From the House of Commons, together with a few members of the House of Lords, a group of about fifty is chosen, called the *Ministry*, to whom the conduct of the affairs of the nation and empire is entrusted. Within the Ministry, a smaller group (at present twenty), including the heads of all the great Departments, forms the *Cabinet*, on whom falls direct responsibility for the proposal of laws and for the relations of England to her colonies and to other nations. All the most important laws which are passed are proposed by the Cabinet. The House of Commons has the power of controlling the Ministry, and thus becomes responsible for its actions.

In this way the citizens govern themselves; and this is why England is called a *democratic* country.

In addition to the power entrusted to the

people at large to make the laws by which they are governed through their Parliamentary representatives, the citizens of particular districts, counties, cities, have the power to choose representatives who shall make regulations regarding local affairs. These regulations have the force of laws within the limited district; for the authority by which they are made is that of the national Government. Such bodies of elected representatives form County Councils, Urban Councils, Boards of Guardians. The health and welfare of the people is affected most intimately by the efficiency or inefficiency of these bodies, as many people know by bitter experience.

So, whether we may hope for good laws to be made, and, when made, for them to be properly administered, depends on the wisdom with which the citizens choose their representatives when they vote by ballot at elections.

Political Parties

'To make the people fit to choose,' said John Milton, two hundred and fifty years ago, 'and the chosen fit to govern; to teach them not to admire wealth or birth; to hate turbulence and ambition; to place every one his private welfare and happiness in the public peace, liberty, and safety—till this be done, I am in

doubt whether our State will ever be thoroughly settled; never are we likely till then to see an end of our troubles and continual changes.' *To make the people fit to choose, and the chosen fit to govern*—when that is accomplished, in the full meaning of the words, then the best hopes for our country, that her best sons could dream of, will be fulfilled.

In the meantime, all who take part in politics, both electors and elected, *profess* that it is the true interests of the country which they desire to forward. The honest citizens, who are fit to choose, or, when chosen, are fit to govern, are those who, mistakenly or not, do really seek to serve their country and mankind. The dishonest citizens are those whose real aim is their own interests, popularity, advancement.

Except when moved by sordid or selfish aims, men are really agreed that the purpose of political action must be the true interests of the nation. But what are they? Some, in answer, will speak of empire by land and sea, power in the counsel of nations, manufactures and markets and increase of goods. These are great interests, certainly; but of what good, unless they are rightly used? Only as they help the production of that real wealth of which we spoke.[1]—the wisdom, goodness, and happiness

[1] Chapter VI, p. 80.

of the people—are they good. They belong to the means and not to the end.

And as long as men differ so much in wisdom, training, ability, they will form different and opposite opinions as to the means. It is this that we quarrel about; we all agree or ought to agree about the end. This, of course, makes a difference to our choice of representatives, and to their actions when chosen. Suppose that a majority hold a certain opinion on a public question; they will, of course, try to put it in practice. The minority, holding a different opinion, will try to find the weak points in it, and by argument and persuasion to bring over to their side as many of the majority as they can.

What do these differences amount to, on the whole? They bring to light two opposing principles, each of which is wholesome and necessary. One is the *permanence of institutions and laws*. If this were utterly disregarded, the life of the country would be as shifting and insecure as the waves of the sea. The other is the equally necessary principle of *continual progress*. At present (1908) this principle is upheld by a party, or rather a group of parties, which differ widely in many ways, but agree in this. It involves the displacing of old landmarks and venerable institutions.

In a conflict of opinion between different groups and parties, when something has to be done and argument cannot go on for ever, it is necessary in a democratic country that the opinion of the *majority* should prevail. But it is also necessary—if freedom is to be more than a name—that the minority should be permitted to influence public opinion in every lawful way, by the press, by public meetings, and by the intercourse of everyday life. To our deep discredit be it said, at the time when the nation was plunged in excitement over the South African War, in many places the representatives of the dominant majority had so little self-control and sense of fairness that they tried by violence to stifle free speech on the part of the dissentient minority. If ever you yield to the temptation to meet the utterances of a party opposed to your own, by a policy of 'shouting down,' and ruffianism, you are moving away from civilization towards savagery, and turning your back upon that progress in morality and freedom which is worth infinitely more than the victory of any party.

Party government has great dangers; and yet the system seems an inevitable consequence of perfectly reasonable and legitimate differences of opinion regarding practical questions.

We saw what some of the worst dangers are.[1] Whenever you have people who hold similar opinions about great practical questions, forming themselves into a party under leaders, you always have the danger that in trying to strengthen the party and win support for it, they will shut their eyes to much that is morally mischievous. Probably this is the reason why some people, not from mean or selfish motives, refuse to touch politics; they imagine there is something morally contaminating about it. But what folly could be greater than for the well-intentioned and the worthy to stand aside and allow the direction of affairs to fall into the hands of the ignorant and incompetent, the prejudiced, or even the immoral! And, yet in English local government, this has happened many times; and every time, there were enough men who did not vote (that is, who failed to perform their simple duty) to turn the scale between the right and the wrong. Every qualified voter is under the most solemn obligation to use that vote, and to use it intelligently. To use it intelligently is just to use the best intelligence you have in answering these two questions: What sort of men are they who are seeking your support, and what are their past records and their characters? What

[1] Chapter II, p. 31.

are the main measures at issue in the election, and whether this measure or that will be likely to help the condition of affairs in the city or country, or to make it worse? It is one of the good signs of our time that the first of these questions needs not to be asked nearly as often as formerly; but the second only becomes more urgent as time goes on, and makes a greater demand on the intelligence of our people.

Position of the Sovereign

I have spoken so much of self-government and of democracy, that now the question naturally arises, What does the Sovereign do in all this?

Some people, who do not know much about the working of the British Constitution, imagine that the King or Queen of England is like the 'figure-head' that ships formerly had—of no use, but having a certain sentimental interest, and hedged round with venerable customs. This is a great mistake, and might easily become a dangerous mistake.

It is quite true that the Sovereign does not directly govern the country, and does not directly control its relations to other countries, as he did, say, three hundred years ago. Thus, as we said, the South African War was not the

act of Queen Victoria—who exerted herself to the utmost to prevent it—but of the people themselves. In all official statements about the Sovereign's relations to Parliament and to the legislation of the Government, the *words* used are still those which belong to the time when he did personally and directly govern; but the words have lost their former meaning. Thus, again, the 'Royal Assent' is always given to a law which has passed both Houses of Parliament; and the 'King's Speech' at the opening of Parliament is the work of the Cabinet.

What does the Sovereign do, then? I answer by quoting two statements made by two famous statesmen of the Victorian period.

The late William Ewart Gladstone spoke thus, when reviewing a Life of the Prince Consort: 'The weighty business of kingship has, in modern times, been undergoing a silent but almost entire transformation. The change may chiefly be perceived in a beneficial substitute of *influence* for *power*. Although the arrangements of the Constitution have now completely shielded the Sovereign from personal responsibility, they have left ample scope for the exercise of a direct and personal influence in the whole work of government.' After pointing out that the amount of this influence must greatly vary, according to the character of the

occupant of the throne, his capacity, his experience in affairs, his tact in the application of a pressure which is never to be carried to extremes, Mr. Gladstone continued, 'Subject to the range of these variations, the Sovereign, as compared with the members of the Ministry, has the advantages of long experience, wide survey, elevated position, and entire disconnexion from the bias of party.' It is clear that such influence depends greatly on the ability and character of the Sovereign. If weak or careless of duty, he would lose all hold upon the Government and the country, and bring his high office into disrepute, as the 'Four Georges' had brought it a century ago. But when, as 'the one great official who always remains in office,' he has the wisdom and capacity to make the best of his position, he acquires an influence which grows in value with time and experience.

The way in which Queen Victoria used the influence thus gained, is shown in this statement made by the late Lord Salisbury. 'She always maintained and practised a rigorous supervision over public affairs, giving to her ministers her frank advice, warning them of danger, if she saw there was danger ahead. She certainly impressed many of us with a profound sense of the penetration with which she saw the perils we might be threatened with

in any course it was thought expedient to adopt. She left upon my mind, she left upon our minds, the conviction that it was always a dangerous matter to press on in any course of the expediency of which she was not thoroughly convinced; and without venturing upon details, I may say with confidence that no minister in her long reign ever disregarded her advice without afterwards feeling that he had incurred a dangerous responsibility.'

It is noteworthy that the two great political opponents, Gladstone and Salisbury, are entirely at one in their opinion of the work done by the late Queen—an opinion confirmed by statesmen of all parties. There appears to be an equally unanimous feeling on the part of the people of the British Islands, that her successor has maintained, and even more than maintained, the high tradition which she created and left behind her.

International Action

A nation cannot live for and to itself, any more than an individual person can. Nations influence one another in ways that are likely to deepen and increase as intercourse and mutual understanding increase. Science is already 'cosmopolitan'; scientific workers in different countries get into touch with one

another and forward each other's work, without differences of nationality coming into consideration at all. In science it is never a question of whether an idea is English, French, or German, but whether it is true. Art and literature are rapidly becoming cosmopolitan. Nations are co-operating, as we see in the numerous *International Congresses* held from time to time, where men of different nationalities meet on a common platform for interchange of ideas and experience; and even in the attempts (feeble as they have been) to unite for the suppression of some of the suffering and mischief caused by war.

Still we are a very long way distant from 'the Parliament of Man, the Federation of the World,' of which Tennyson speaks; and it remains true that our own country is that which unites us, and gives us common traditions and common hopes that bind us together in spite of all differences of profession and rank, all rivalries of interest, all oppositions of character and belief. That heritage from the past, of which I spoke,[1] marks our deep debt to those long dead, whose work has remained in the betterment of the world. The past to which we are indebted is wide as humanity itself; but our inheritance from it is richest and

[1] Chapter VI, pp. *76*, *88*.

greatest in the influence on us of our own country's past, which affects us most powerfully and enfolds us most intimately. We serve humanity best by serving our country's better life. The growth of character and social well-being, which we look to as the supreme test of right and wrong, is realized first of all in our place and surroundings as sons and daughters of our country.

A nation is not made in a day. Fifteen centuries and more have gone to the making of Britain; centuries of national storm and stress of conflict with other nations, and with the elements of discord and division within. The life of a nation is welded like iron on the anvil. And to learn the history of our country right is to learn the labour that it cost to make her. It is a scandal that such vast numbers of our citizens are so ignorant of the nation's past. It is time history became to us something more than a name filled with dreary recollections of senseless drudgery at school. It is the story of the life that is largely responsible for our present state; and every deed in the past that formed new health and strength into that life, is a deed of help *to us*. '*Here* and *here* did England help me; how can I help England?

Chapter VIII

SOCIAL JUSTICE

THE past has handed down to us a splendid heritage of national freedom and national honour, giving its inspiring power to Nelson's great battle-signal, which is now the signal for the life's work of every one of us: 'England expects that every man this day will do his duty.' We may not have to die for our country; but we can learn to live for her, and encounter all the tasks which the new time is throwing upon us.

For if we have inherited the power to deal with dangers, at home and abroad, we have now dangers to deal with, in the heart of the nation's life, such as never were seen there before. We are confronted by the great social evils of our day, the diseases of civilization.

Just as the human body may suffer from disease, so what is called the 'body politic' of

a nation may be diseased. In the time of Christ, the Empire of Rome was suffering from diseases mortal and incurable—it was dying year by year. The civilization of the western world—and especially the advanced countries of Europe and America—is suffering from diseases now, not incurable, but none the less real.

What are the symptoms of these diseases? In answer, we point to the evil and wretchedness that lurk in our crowded cities; the hardship and destitution that still survive alongside of the greatest wealth that any people have ever accumulated; the vulgar ambition and greed that darken our political and social life. We point to the monopolies that profit the few and impoverish the many; the manufacture of paupers at one end and millionaires at the other; the children who are born into the world with the doom of death instead of the promise of life hanging over them; the thousands of 'sweated' workers toiling for a starvation wage; the probability of an old age in the poorhouse for nobody knows how many of the workers; the power of the drink traffic that corrupts political life, until it is a real menace to the nation.

It is clear that the Divine Plan of the World

includes the possibility of us human beings making mistakes, and very terrible mistakes. We are *allowed* to make mistakes, and *intended* to learn by the consequences of our mistakes.

We cannot turn aside now to ask *why* we are allowed to make mistakes, beyond suggesting that learning by experience, costly though it be, is a training which produces a higher kind of life and character, than if we were 'wound up' once for all and set going like clocks made to keep perfect time.

But not only individual persons make mistakes; communities and nations make them, and incur similar penalties. These are mistakes made by people 'collectively' in political and social life. The modern civilized world has made them; and hence the 'body politic' is diseased.

It will be helpful for us to find out, if we can, some of the causes of these social troubles.

Private Ownership

As men rise from animalism and barbarism, among the many changes which take place is the growth of ownership, or private property.

What you have read about the American Indians shows you a state of things where such property as any man possessed was very simple and very rough—at least until the introduction

of the horse and the rifle—so that there was very little trade; what there was, took the form of mere exchange. For a different condition, yet one almost as simple, you may refer to what is said in the Bible about Jacob, and about Job; and notice the kind of property which men possessed in those days.[1] But when clans and tribes ceased to wander from place to place, and settled in a single territory, and above all when they began to live in cities, and different occupations arose, and wants began to increase, then there were many more different kinds of property and possession, and trade (exchange and commerce) multiplied. Then, with increase of travel, the people of one place began to desire the things that another place produced, and so trade grew and spread still further, and a merchant class arose.

Along with these changes, there arose a class of persons who acquired wealth and lived differently from their less wealthy neighbours, and whose lives stood in specially marked con-

[1] Some interesting Hebrew laws concerning property are found in Exodus xxii. 1–15, and (of later date) Leviticus xix. 9–11, 13, 35–6; xxv. 23–9, 35–8. For indications of the increasing luxury which followed the building of cities, see Amos v. 11, vi. 4–6; Ezekiel xxvii. 1–25; Revelation xviii. 11–14.

trast with those of the *poor*. This contrast of rich and poor was fully developed in the ancient world, and in modern times has become more prominent than ever.

The fact that a limited number of persons possesses a disproportionate share of the world's wealth, does not, of course, prove that private ownership is an evil. It is clear that this kind of ownership—the possession of that which is a man's own, and at his own disposal—has grown along with the growth of humanity from barbarism. Experience has shown that the attempt to do away with it altogether is vain. The causes of poverty do not come from the fact that people are allowed to *possess* things.

Some Causes of Wealth and Poverty

Let us look at the origin of the most important kinds of property which have come to be recognized in modern times. First comes all money *reward for labour* of every kind—all earning and saving; then, acquisitions *due to no services* or labour—'finds' that do not belong to others—'lucky' investments—gifts—inheritance; then *land*, acquired by purchase, gift, or inheritance, and originally acquired by occupation of wild unused land, as when the first settlers in America cleared, fenced, and tilled the ground; and *increase in*

land value, due to no services rendered by the owner—as when a mine is discovered on the property, or a town begins to spread over it.

But besides these lawful ways in which property may be acquired, there is more or less of wealth which had its origin long ago in fraud or violence, as when the original settlers are dispossessed and driven out, and their land given to others; and there may be wealth, the origin of which was in illegitimate or hurtful occupations, as the slave-trade, or gambling. In both cases the rights of the present owners, who have acquired the property lawfully, are recognized. To dispossess them without compensation would destroy all men's confidence in social order and justice, to say nothing of the dishonesty of the act itself.

In any of the ways mentioned, men become rich. In the case of earnings, this is the result of genius, or special ability or skill of some kind. There is such a thing as what is called 'business ability,' in so managing the buying and selling of goods as to make large profits. To be responsible for a business, i.e. to manage it yourself, requires abilities of a certain kind, which some men have and some have not got. This kind of ability may go with honesty just as well as dishonesty; neither the honesty

nor the dishonesty *by itself* would make the fortune. The business ability does it. Hence it is absurd to suppose that a man cannot *honestly* make a large fortune in business; and if, being honest, he fails, it is not the fault of his honesty, but, generally, of his want of the right kind of ability.

It has been very truly said that the merchant or trader increases the value of goods by bringing them to market. The wheat gathered in the warehouses is actually worth more than it was in the farmers' barns. The merchant's 'profits,' the excess of his sales over their cost, are simply his wages for the services he renders in collecting and distributing the goods. The evil arises when *too many men* try to get in between the producer and the consumer, each trying to get a profit by selling to the next.[1]

While some have more wealth than they can ever use, many more are forced by severe competition to live on a bare pittance. The majority of these depend on the wages of unskilled manual labour. Their work is absolutely necessary to the life of a civilized community.

Here we come again upon what we were speaking of in connexion with the real hardships of labour. I hinted at how the supply

[1] See Mr. John Dendy's chapter on 'Business,' "Successful Life," ch. xiv.

of labour, as compared with the demand for it, affects the wages paid for it. The existence of such *large numbers* of those who live by manual labour brings down their wages, or keeps many out of employment altogether. This is the working of competition. Competition means that there are too many people wanting to do the same kind of work. This is not always their own fault.

Nor is this the only cause, utterly beyond their control, which is liable to plunge the workers into poverty. The periodical 'depression of trade' is responsible for a great deal of the keenest distress. For example, in the present year (1908) an excess of commercial speculations, mainly in America, has brought about a depression of trade which has compelled many manufacturers to reduce production, and brought about widespread unemployment and want.

These are not the only causes of poverty. There is *inefficiency*, natural defects of body or mind, resulting in lack of energy or skill. There is *misfortune*, accident, ill-health, and the like. There is *wilful idleness*. There is *vice* of all kinds, especially drunkenness. There is *ignorance*, worse, if possible, than vice; resulting in waste of money, waste of food, waste of life itself and most of all, of child-life.

If you think over this list of the things from which poverty springs, you will see that some of them are the direct result of those social ills which we called diseases of civilization ; others are the direct result of moral faults on the part of men and women themselves.

Duties of Ownership

These social ills, caused as they are by mistakes made collectively, must be cured by collective or public action, by trial, experiment, and above all, by *observing consequences*. This is the importance of social reform. All sound, social reform is a means of cure, hence all schemes, sincerely put forward, demand just and candid examination.

This means thinking. But God gave us brains to use, as much as hands and feet.

It is not, however, part of our purpose here to discuss particular schemes of legislative reform which could be carried out by Act of Parliament. Our interest is mainly in *conduct* —that is, in the voluntary efforts of individuals and associations.

Now if there is any truth at all in the principle to which we are appealing throughout these chapters, it follows at once that *the owner of property is a trustee*. To deny this, or (what is the same thing) to declare that ' a man may do

what he likes with his own,' is a grossly immoral falsehood. We do not often hear it *said* that a man may do what he likes with what is his; the moral responsibilities of ownership are not often openly and frankly denied. They may be frankly denied by the 'fast' youth who squanders thousands on the turf or in worse ways; or by the working man who spends three-quarters of his weekly wage on his own pleasures (that is, of course, on drink, and tobacco, and an occasional attempt to 'back a winner') and gives the other quarter to his wife to feed and clothe herself and the children and pay the rent and rates. But the responsibilities of ownership are denied more often in deed than in word.

We said that 'the owner of property is a trustee.' Take the case of the average millionaire. No one supposes that in his case, his wealth represents the value of his services to the public (if he has performed any). By various means, he has managed to acquire a portion of the accumulated wealth of the community; and if he holds it rightly, he holds it in trust for purposes of the general good. 'It is not merely generosity to give,' says an American writer, 'it is the return of an obligation, or the fulfilment of a trust. In fact, a portion of the accumulated wealth of the past

is always due, not only for present needs, but also in special provision for the future—for public works and buildings; for schools and colleges; for works of philanthropy and religion. The more property a man has, the larger his responsibility for these purposes.'

But trusteeship is not limited to the very rich. Our possessions are our own and not common property, but they are our own for the common good, which consists in all men living out the best that is in them. However modest our means may be, we are morally responsible for the disposal of them. We are not to be like infants who waste and destroy what they have. Yet many of the homes of the poorest, where the want is greatest, are the places where the parents themselves are overgrown children in their utter incapacity for wise use of such slender resources as they possess.

Here again we are met by the unmanly and cowardly 'helpless victim' idea—that all the sufferings of the poor are due to unjust social conditions, that they can do nothing for themselves and ought not to try, that everything ought to be done for them, that they have no *duties*, only *rights*. To say that all the poor and the unemployed are so by their own fault alone, would be quite false; but some of the

causes of their poverty *are* within their own control; and to persuade them of the contrary, only makes their inevitable hardships worse.[1]

Different kinds of Co-operation

I spoke of the need of *collective action* to cure the social ills of our time—'co-operation'—a word which I now use in a very wide sense, to mean the *working together* of many different people for a common purpose.

I ask your special attention to this. Co-operation is a possibility which we are only beginning to realize. We are learning it by trial and experiment; we are (so to speak) children at it; but there is good reason to believe that the spirit of voluntary co-operation is the one means by which the social salvation of the world may be accomplished.

Whenever you have people working together of their own free will and according to a definite plan and purpose, each one sharing in the work and in the benefit (whatever it is), then you have co-operation. Naturally there are many different kinds of it, according to the extent and purpose of the combination. But whatever the purpose, and whether the number of persons joining in it is large or small, co-operation is impossible without three things. First, *in-*

[1] See chapter VI, p. 87.

telligence on the part of the members. Second, *confidence* in each other. And, third, as a consequence of these two, the principle of 'give and take,' meaning here that each one works *not for himself alone, but for the good of the whole.*

When I come to ask where we may look for the best examples of co-operation, I find a piece of evidence showing how backward the world is in its wisdom and knowledge of how to live. For one of the best illustrations of what genuine collective action means, is found, not in anything that concerns the great needs and the real work of the world, but in its play. Look at a good football or cricket team. If you understand the spirit of co-operation and responsibility which animates the band of players—the co-operation of each with all, and the responsibility of each and all for the honour and success of the whole, each one seeing the reason and meaning of what he does—and if you can imagine that spirit living and working among men, not only in their games, but in their social life in general: if you can imagine it working between buyer and seller, employer and employed, and among all the various classes in the community; then you have grasped the idea of the world's greatest need.

I say we are only learning co-operation; our business is to educate ourselves into it. The

qualities—such as intelligent ability and experience, and imaginative sympathy—which enable men to work together for mutual good, are qualities which have to be grown, and they grow slowly.

There are, however, many clear signs that the spirit of co-operation, and the desire for it, really exist in the world. No society or association with definite objects and rules can live without something of that spirit. Voluntary co-operation among citizens, temporary or permanent, for particular purposes is one of the marked characteristics of modern times. The same spirit has made possible the great development of Trades Unions, professional societies, Friendly Societies, Building Societies, and the like. There are signs of the good influence of the spirit of co-operation in the gradual increase of 'profit-sharing' and 'copartnership' between capitalist and worker. In the one case the capitalist employer, while paying his workers a share of the profits they help to produce, retains all the capital and all the control in his own hands. In the other case the worker is allowed to invest in the business his share of profit or his other savings, and so obtain a share in capital and control. The possibility of this depends on the workmen's business aptitude and also on their

capacity for taking broad and public-spirited views.

Ideal Brotherhood

In speaking of co-operation, we mean, of course, co-operation for good and worthy purposes. But even if a gang of criminals are to maintain their combination at all, they must be honest *to one another*. If they dealt with the outside world as they deal with one another, they would cease to be criminals.

We value all co-operation for good, not only because it relieves social evils, but above all because it is a step towards the *social ideal*—the perfect realization of what human society ought to be. What would a perfect society be like? It could not be less than *perfect brotherhood*, in which all men's dealings with one another are determined by love. In perfect brotherhood, love is the constraining power and the supreme law of life, felt and known to be so by the members. What does this mean? It means not less than these five things.

First—not competition, where the success of one means the failure of another; but that noble emulation which means eagerness for the successes which bring further life to the whole.

Second—helpful healing power of the whole

over the parts. Generosity would be the rule the weak or ignorant would not be taken advantage of, but always helped, and if need be uplifted and led.

Third—redeeming power. The sinful, the indolent, the selfish, the passionate, would be compelled to feel the law of love and recognize its silent, ceaseless pressure on them. For though restraint must needs be imposed on them, it would be imposed by stronger, wiser more loving natures.

Fourth—not mere self-sacrifice on the part of the members, but each one living his own best life and in living it helping the others to live theirs. This we found always to be the law reconciling true self-regard and regard for others.

Fifth—not mere sameness or uniformity of character and conduct, but such a variety as makes the whole a *harmony*. A perfect brotherhood would be one whole in virtue of its law of love, but there would be a vast variety of character and experience on the part of its individual members. In music, when instruments of many kinds sound different notes, we may have a symphony which is one of the most magnificent expressions of feeling that we know of. Such would be the harmony of a perfect brotherhood,

and such is the dream and hope of the world.

The spirit which—for want of a better word—I have called perfect brotherhood, is an ideal. Yet we find its beginnings in the world in which we now live. Some of it lives in every true *home*, and makes home-life, at its best, the finest training-ground for the true life in the world. Even the different kinds of attempted co-operation which we have named, are small beginnings of the spirit of brotherhood in public life. And those expressions of the spirit of compassionate sympathy, of which we spoke,[1] are in their avowed intention attempts to give wider extension and reality to the ideal of the brotherhood of man. 'They all start,' says Mr. Philip Henry Wicksteed, 'from the idea of giving such utterance to the collective life as to make each individual feel that he is surrounded by friendly forces, anxious for his welfare, sensitive to his sorrows, ready to succour his weakness instead of taking advantage of it, seeking to raise him up when fallen, and to restore him when he has gone astray, recognizing the foundation truth that there is a full life for him, worthy to be lived, if he can but get at it.'

[1] Chapter IV, p. 48.

The Survival of the Fittest

It is useful to contrast the principles of co-operation and brotherhood with their opposites; and then to notice what science has to say on the matter. The opposite principle is—'Each man for himself, and let the hindmost take his chance'; 'Let the weakest go to the wall'; 'The good old rule, the simple plan, that they shall take who have the power, and they shall keep who can'; 'If anyone cannot hold his own, let him go under—he has only himself to blame for not being strong and pushing enough.' All this sounds brutal; but, as a simple matter of fact, we see these very principles in operation on a great scale in the commercial and industrial world.

Some men tell us that this state of things is absolutely right and never ought to be changed. They say that lopping off the weak strengthens the stock, for then only the strong go on to increase and multiply. Carry this a little further and you are led to the conclusion that consumption and fever, starvation and plague, are the best means for preserving and strengthening the human race, for those who are strong enough survive them, and those who are not strong enough are got rid of, so that 'the survival of the

fittest' is secured. We injure society by doing too much for the weak.

Now where does this idea come from? It does not come only from the so-called 'self-made man,' or from the mere ignorant, unimaginative, selfish rich. It comes often from persons who think that Charles Darwin, the great evolutionist, proved that the progress of the world depends on the 'survival of the fittest,' and that he meant by this 'the survival of the strongest.' The struggle for existence among a species of animals, in natural conditions, differs totally from the mere struggle for advancement or wealth with which writers frequently compare it. Professor E. Ray Lankester has spoken plainly on this point in his book "The Kingdom of Man": 'An objectionable misinterpretation of the doctrine of the survival of the fittest is made by journalists and literary politicians, who declare, according to their political bias, either that science rightly teaches that the gross quality measured by wealth and strength alone can survive, and should therefore alone be cultivated; or, that science has done serious injury to the progress of mankind by authorizing this teaching. Both are wrong, and owe their error to self-satisfied flippancy and traditional ignorance in regard to nature-

knowledge and the teachings of Darwin. The *fittest* does not mean the *strongest*. The causes of survival, among the various kinds of living creatures, are very far indeed from being rightly described as mere strength, nor are they baldly similar to the power of accumulating wealth. Frequently in Nature the more obscure and feeble survive in the struggle because of their modesty and suitability to given conditions, whilst the rich are sent empty away and the mighty perish by hunger.'

There is something even more important than this to be remembered when we hear people talk about 'the survival of the fittest.' In numberless animal societies, the struggle *between separate individuals* for the means of existence disappears, struggle is replaced by co-operation, and this change results in the development of intellectual and moral faculties which secure to the species the best means of survival. Holding to the idea of 'the survival of the fittest,' Darwin showed that in those cases the 'fittest' were not the strongest nor the cunningest, but those who had learnt to combine so as to help each other, strong and weak together, for the common good; and he added these striking words: 'Those communities which included the greatest num-

ber of the most sympathetic members would flourish best and rear the greatest number of offspring.'

This is not enough to justify Socialism or any particular political scheme, but it shows that *ruthless unrestrained competition* is not only against the teachings of Jesus Christ but against the teachings of Nature. Some amount of competition may be wholesome and necessary; but the surest means for giving to each and all the greatest safety, the best guarantee of existence and progress, bodily, intellectual, and moral, is not competition but the true co-operation which prepares the way for brotherhood.

Socialism

Having referred to Socialism, I wish to suggest to you a few facts which may help you to come to an intelligent opinion on this vexed question.

We need to clear up our ideas a little. For example, there are still people to be found who confuse 'Socialism,' 'Anarchism,' and 'Communism.' Anarchism is the opposite of Socialism; it means there shall be no government and no law and nothing like what we call the State; men are to live together entirely according to their own devices and their own

free will. Communism is not Socialism; it means that the tools, instruments, and necessaries of life are to be 'common property.' Anarchism shows itself chiefly in attempts to overthrow the present social order by violence. Communism has ceased to be a practical matter. Socialism, however, is a stronger force than ever. Many of the current denunciations of Socialism are obviously insincere, and appeal only to passion, prejudice, or selfishness.

The name 'Socialism' is like the names 'Religion' and 'Christianity' in this way—that it stands for a large number of very different things. I cannot here attempt to describe even a few of the different kinds of Socialism; but only to fix on the one thing which they all have in common.

First, however, we must clear up one confusion which is fatal to understanding what is at issue. The name 'Socialism' ought not to be used in the same breath or on the same page—as many writers and speakers do use it—to mean *the spirit or ideal of brotherhood* on the one hand, and a particular method of realizing that ideal, *a particular kind of social and political reform*, on the other. If Socialism means the spirit of brotherhood, and what we have suggested that

brotherhood implies, then all who believe that the world can be made better are Socialists. Thus, Mr. H. G. Wells, in his book "New Worlds for Old," defines Socialism as the substitution of 'the spirit of service' for 'the spirit of gain.' He urges—as we have already done[1]—that the most important factor in true social progress is character and 'goodwill' enlightened by intelligence; and says that 'we Socialists take up to-day the assertion the early Christians were the first to make, that mankind is of one household and one substance; the Samaritan who stoops to the wounded stranger by the wayside is our brother rather than the Levite.' To use the same word in this wide moral meaning, and in the narrower meaning of some special scheme of improvement, is fatal to clear thinking.

Practical Socialism—that is, Socialism which has some definite proposal to make—means an extension of government action, government ownership, government control. It is clear that this would be mere tyranny unless the action of the Government is practically the same as *the collective action of the people.* Hence, the Government being made as representative of the people as possible, its powers

[1] Chapter III, p. 36.

of ownership and control are to be indefinitely extended. How far extended, and by what means—these are the points in which different schools of Socialism differ. Any scheme for extending State ownership and control may be described as 'socialistic,' provided you do not use that word merely as a term of abuse.

You cannot therefore discuss Socialism, with any profit, without getting at some particular socialistic scheme, and discussing that scheme on its merits. And in doing this, it is of the greatest importance to realize the number and variety of the socialistic schemes which are already in legal operation among us, and of which almost all the enterprises of the national Government and of local governing bodies, which we mentioned before, are examples,[1] together with a great many more which are inspected, partly regulated, or partly controlled by the State. The question then takes this form: How far can this kind of thing be carried? Would it be possible for the State to acquire and work the Railways? Would it be possible for the State to acquire and work the Land, and be the universal landlord? What evils result from the private ownership of land?

Extreme Socialism goes, of course, a great

[1] Chapter VII, p. 106.

deal further than these proposals go. But, whether extreme or moderate, the principle at issue is always the same—the possibility and desirability of some sort of State action.

Now there is not the least doubt that the possibility and desirability of extending State action depends on the growth among our people of two things: *administrative capacity*—the ability to direct and to share in the carrying out of large concerns; and the *desire and will to co-operate* of which I have spoken, and to co-operate for *the common good.*

As instances of administrative capacity of a very high order, I may mention such a man as the American, John D. Rockefeller, head of the 'Standard Oil Company.' The world needs such abilities, directed not to the enrichment of a great combination by fair and unfair means, but to the good of all. Another instance of such capacity, but directed not to mere money-getting, is seen in the work of the organizers of the great British Trades Unions—such as the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants. Labour troubles will decrease, when combinations of workmen and of employers alike, instead of working solely for the interests of their class, realize that their interests are only part of the wider interests of the public in general;

in a word, when they remember the common good. There are welcome signs of progress in the right direction, in the number of occasions, within the last three years, where the parties in a trade dispute have availed themselves of the Conciliation Act, under which the Board of Trade has the power to appoint a Conciliator in such disputes, and an Arbitrator at the request of both parties.

There is a great deal of sheer *mental immaturity* in the world. By this I mean, a narrow outlook on life, an incapacity to understand the real needs of any but a few, or a class; and a sheer inability to think connectedly on any subject larger than the mere personal business or pleasure of the day. Our people are only just beginning to learn the capacity for the *collective action* which is needed not only for Socialism but for any genuine social reform. So far as that mental immaturity (of which I have spoken) prevails, so far any real collective action is carried on under the greatest difficulty and danger. For it is not the action of a mob, but that of an organized band, which deserves to be called 'collective action'; which works according to the ideal of St. Paul, through 'many members in one body.'

If I were asked to suggest one way of

beginning to break down the inert opposition of the mass of mental immaturity that prevails, it would be this. Let us see whether it is possible to get into people's minds the idea that there is such a thing as *the common good*, something which is the good, not of any one class or party against the others, but the good of each and all; and that every real and lasting good is so because it works for the common good.

Chapter IX

THE GREAT PLAN

THIS world, we have found, is not put together by accident or chance, but constructed according to a Plan—a plan worked out by laws which may be disregarded but are never broken. Among these are included all that Science speaks of as 'Laws of Nature.'

When we have found out such a law and its manner of working, what does it tell us? It always tells us that *if* certain things are done *then* certain results will follow. *The laws of nature are laws with an 'if.'* Every scientific experiment is an example of such a law; it is a question put to Nature, to see what she will do *if* we do certain things. The world is made according to laws of this kind throughout its entire range and in things visible and invisible.

These laws are laws of God. By this I mean that they are the expression of the thought

and life of God himself. Here are to be found the laws of right and wrong; and the reasons for them are eternal. The reasons for them lie in the fact that if you do not obey you must inevitably suffer, in becoming less of a *human* being and more of an animal or a *thing*.

There is another side to it. We suffer for disregarding not only the laws we know, but also for disregarding those we do not know—and they are very many. Some of the worst disasters and sufferings which befall us occur from this reason. The only direction in which we can look for an explanation is this. What is learnt at such a cost, what men have wrought into their very being by suffering and struggle, must have a far greater value in God's eyes than we at present understand. We know of ourselves that the experience and knowledge and strength, so gained, are actually of great worth; but, the truth must be, their worth is so great that no price of suffering and death is too high to pay for them.

The Ascent of Man

I spoke also of the way in which man's work has transformed both the workers and the world. Try to grasp this idea of the *gradual ascent of life* as modern Science reveals

it. Man did not appear until millions of years after the earth had become fit for life. The earliest and lowest forms of life appeared first in the water; then came fishes, then reptiles, then birds and different kinds of land animals.

When man first appeared, he was little above the animals; a naked savage, with no houses, no fire, no weapons or tools. The discovery of fire, and the making of huts, boats, weapons, and tools marked the first great age of material advance. The second was marked by the discovery of how to work metals. These were discoveries of things in the outside world. The moral advance was marked by men's discovery in themselves of the power of self-control and tribal sympathy, needed if they were to live together and possess any united strength.

The immense ascendancy of man over the animals to-day is due to two classes of facts. In body, man stands erect; he has hands; he has, comparatively, a very large and highly developed brain. In mental power, though many animals can reason a little, and most can remember, and all can feel, man's power of speech has made him beyond comparison superior. Speech means the formation of a great variety of distinct ideas; it means

intercourse; and, when writing is discovered, it means the preservation of man's thoughts and what he has learnt and done.

Owing to the great accumulation of scientific discoveries, the modern world has advanced materially far more than the ancient. But it has also made for itself moral problems far harder than any which the ancients had to answer. These problems can be met only as men get control of themselves and their surroundings, that is, as they find out the laws of God and learn to obey them or work with them. Man says, 'I want to do or make such and such a thing, for it will be good'; God's laws in the world say, 'If you want to do that, you must do this and this *first*.'

All the material aspect of what we call invention, industry, and civilization, has been accomplished thus. By his own energies man has put some of the laws of Nature into operation, and through them has wrought out these great results. These laws of God were here before man discovered them, before man came; he has searched them out and worked with them. And the story of how human deeds work in the world and bring forth each its fitting result—the story which we have dwelt on all through this book—is really the story of how man learns God's moral laws.

The Divine Plan

Every step in this ascent, long and slowly wrought out, is due to man's effort and trial. Just as Abraham went out 'not knowing whither he went,' yet went out to seek 'a better city,' so human life from the beginning has been moved by an endeavour after progress, after something better. This increasing endeavour does not come from nothing. We see in it the increasing contact of the Divine with the human spirit.

Now human deeds have results which are—so to speak—combined and directed to purposes vaster than the agents could ever have known—as when Columbus sailed West to find another way to the imagined riches of China and the Indies, and discovered America without knowing it. Good deeds lead to purposes never dreamt of by the doer; evil deeds lead to ends often quite opposed to their original purpose; insignificant or indifferent acts issue in results utterly beyond the power of the agents to conceive. The human beings who are the instruments of such purposes no more know what they are doing or where they are going, than the bees when in seeking for honey they fertilize the flowers.

This is the conception of a Great Plan being wrought out in the world—a plan in which we

men and our actions are embraced. It means also that the world is not yet made—it is in the making; creation is not yet finished—it is only fairly begun. We must be in earnest with this thought of 'the world being only in the making.' Suppose that you were looking at the underside of some very beautiful tapestry; being able to see only the underside, you would have a very imperfect idea of the pattern. Suppose, further, that the pattern was in the making and not finished, then still less would you be able to form an adequate idea of the design. This is just how we stand with regard to the Great Plan. We can trace the outlines of some fragments of it, and that is all; but we see enough to know that however vast and boundless its scope may be, *for us* it means the culture and development of that spirit which expresses itself in what we called Co-operation and Brotherhood.

THE END

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